Although the text of the Jay treaty contained a clause providing that the agreement should in no way violate our treaty obligations to France, its spirit was, nevertheless, hostile to our treaties of 1778. With England to interpret and a Federalist administration to revise their interpretation, it was not difficult to see that French interests would suffer.
The extension of the definition of contraband so as to include materials for equipping ships, the allowance of the right of search, and the permission that British prizes might be brought into American ports were all taken by France as infringements of her treaties. They were, no doubt, contrary to a spirit of alliance, which the treaties had bound us to observe, but which we had not been required by France strictly to execute.
But the Jay treaty aside, many people by 1797 had come to look upon the perpetual obligations which the French treaties imposed upon the United States as an inconvenience. A few men, and John Adams was one of them, took the same view in 1778; but the needs of America were so great at that time that the French aid was accepted as it was offered, without attempts to modify the conditions. From the outbreak of the war between France and England in 1793, the extreme Federalists hoped that something would occur to justify the repeal of treaties on our part.
France did not leave us to annul the treaties. The Jay compact was published in the Parisian papers about August 15, 1795. For a time, no complaint was made, but on February 15, 1796, the foreign minister assumed a threatening tone and told Monroe that our English agreement annulled the old French treaties. The clear purpose was to frighten the Americans into a relinquishment of the new connection with England. Monroe's indefinite course in Paris and the communications from Fauchet and Adet, French ministers in Philadelphia, tended to convince them that if France put on a threatening air, Americans could be got to vote the Republican ticket in 1796 and reverse the policy of the country. They studiously withheld their intentions till the last hope that the Jay treaty would be defeated was gone, and then, in the summer of 1796, they suspended the functions of their minister. He was not ordered home, but left in the country to watch the political situation.
In keeping with the same purpose, France began to punish us by seizing our ships. An order was issued to French privateers and national ships, authorizing them to treat neutral vessels in the manner in which they allowed other belligerents to treat them. If American ships allowed England to seize provisions and ship supplies as contraband, French ships seized them on the same ground. The indefinite manner in which the French order was stated opened the door to many abuses on the part of the French captains, who, in fact, needed no encouragement of that kind. From the beginning of Washington's second administration, there had been complaints that the French were seizing our ships without sufficient grounds, but they were referred to the proper authorities for settlement, and no difficulty was apprehended. As the American policy of neutrality was developed and the consequent French wrath at our conduct increased, the seizures became more frequent, and the restraint of the French government upon them seemed to become less vigorous. So far had they gone by January, 1796, that Hamilton thought that we ought to send to France an envoy extraordinary, as Jay had been sent to England, to come to a final settlement with that nation. The order of 1796 was, therefore, not a sudden departure; it but authorized openly what had been practised covertly for a long time.
Something is to be said for the attitude of France at this time. By her treaty of 1778, contraband had been defined so as not to include provisions; but England never recognized that principle, and since by the Jay treaty we had agreed that provisions might be taken as contraband under certain conditions, she began to take our ships bound to the French ports, on the ground that they were necessary to France as materials of war. The French, therefore, felt that they were treated unequally. England might seize provisions bound to the French West Indies, but France might not seize them bound to the British West Indies. In this contention, she was supported by the Republicans in the United States. Her other contention, that by failing to fight England because she impressed our seamen and seized our ships, we became contributory to the war, was not so easily justified. She had no right to demand that we enforce our rights in order to safeguard the interests of France.
Another grievance against France grew out of an embargo laid at Bordeaux in 1793, by which a large number of American ships were detained in French ports and their cargoes damaged or taken for the use of the French government. Bills for losses were presented to the authorities, and payment was offered in the depreciated currency of the French Republic, but it was refused by the American owners, and the matter remained unsettled and a source of much annoyance.
While affairs were thus becoming ever more grave, in June 1796, an American vessel, the Mount Vernon, was sold in Philadelphia to an English citizen. He could not register her in his own name, and she sailed under the registry of her former owner. She was watched by a French privateer, The Flying-Fish, who followed her down the Delaware and seized her before she was well out of the bay. The incident caused some excitement till it was understood that the American registry of the ship was really a fiction. It served to convince Washington that our relations with France were becoming critical. It was at this time, before he knew that France would suspend the functions of her minister to the United States, that he decided, on the advice of the cabinet, to send to Paris a more capable negotiator than Monroe.
Pinckney, Monroe's successor, arrived in Paris early in December 1796. Monroe was still exercising his functions, although he well knew on what a basis Adet was remaining in Philadelphia. He received his successor with kindness and put him in communication with the French foreign office. Pinckney's credentials were taken with the statement that they should be submitted to the Directory, then the French executive power. A few days later, Monroe was informed that France would not receive another American minister till her grievances were redressed.
This left Pinckney in a delicate situation. A law of the republic, made in the days when most strangers were considered spies, forbade foreigners to remain in France without written permission. Such permission was promised him, but at the end of two weeks it had not been delivered. Pinckney then asked if he would be allowed to remain till he could hear from his government. The reply was noncommittal, and he continued in the country, although he received a broad intimation that he was rendering himself liable to arrest. He knew full well that the government could not afford to imprison a man whose only offence was that he came in behalf of a sister republic which wanted to preserve peace. He preferred, also, to go, if go he must, with a clear utterance that it was the wish of the ministry. Such an assurance he finally got on February 3, 1797, when he was officially informed that he had rendered himself liable to arrest by staying two months in the country without permission. He got passports and left France at once.
The general position of the Directory was at that time a confident one. After many struggles, France seemed about to become, under the new form of government, a strong, victorious power in Europe. Napoleon was just winning glory for his country through his Italian victories. The Directory, ignorant of what his career would bring to them, felt able to ignore the rights of, and even the courtesies due to, the weak republic of the West. Their haughty indifference was stimulated by the fact that news from America indicated the election of a Federalist to succeed Washington in the presidency. To make their position clearer, they gave Monroe, on his departure, the most extravagant expressions of friendship. The world might take notice how little consideration they had for that Federalist agent who still waited at the gate for admission.
When it was understood in America that Pinckney's mission was about to fail, the extreme Federalists became very angry. They would have severed all relations with France, and if this had resulted in universal seizures, which in turn would have brought war, they would have been glad of it. Pickering and the cabinet were disposed to accept this view, but Hamilton and Adams both thought otherwise. They realized that the United States were not ready for war, that they had no navy, and that such a step must have thrown them into close dependence on England, which in itself was a thing full of danger. They preferred to make another effort at negotiation, and while that was going on, to put the country in a better state of defence. They were able to carry their point in this respect, although they did not get the cabinet to agree that a Republican should be sent on the new mission.
When full news from Pinckney was received, Adams called Congress into extra session on May 15, 1797. His speech to it was full of force and of a sense of national dignity. The Directory, he said, in expelling Pinckney from French territory, had treated us "neither as allies, nor as friends, nor as a sovereign state." He called attention to the evident purpose of the Directory to distinguish between the people of America and their government, and declared that the time ought never to come when the nation should fail to support its chosen agents. He announced that he would make further efforts to negotiate, and recommended the consideration of measures of defence.
On the question before it, Congress found itself divided into three groups. The extreme Federalists, led by William Smith and Harper and most of the New England members, were ready for war. They were also supported by the cabinet under the leadership of Pickering and Wolcott. The Republicans insisted that the situation was not perilous, that it had grown up by reason of Federalist mismanagement, and that proper negotiations would restore it to normal conditions. A third group was composed of moderate men who had usually acted with the Federalists. In the House, they were led by Dayton. The Senate was in the hands of the first group, but the third controlled the balance of power in the House and gave direction to the policy of the government. Congress, therefore, was in a position to support Adams's recommendations. The extreme Federalists tempered their ardor while the president's policy was carried out.
It was determined to send three commissioners to France. By common consent, one of them must be Pinckney, in view of his recent outrageous treatment there; the others were Marshall, of Virginia, and Dana, of Massachusetts. The Senate promptly confirmed the nominations, but Dana declined to serve. Then Adams seized the opportunity to return to his purpose to put a Republican on the commission. He realized, as Hamilton had realized, the advantage from such an appointment by quieting the clamors of his opponents at home and by lessening the resentment of the French ministry. He turned to Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, who as a New England Republican, was not entirely objectionable to the Federalists, and for whom he had a sincere personal esteem. The cabinet and many Federalists thought the appointment a bad one, but it was confirmed, although six of the extremists voted against it. Gerry hesitated about accepting, but Jefferson wrote urging him to take the offer, and he consented. Adams joined his private persuasion; nothing, he assured Gerry, could ever destroy his confidence in his friend's integrity. The carping critics, however, dubbed Gerry the president's "own ambassador."
In the meantime, Congress took up the situation. Steps were taken to keep the enthusiasm of the country from running into hostilities before the envoys could try to settle affairs. An act was passed to prohibit the fitting out of privateers against a nation with which we were at peace, and Adams issued orders to prevent merchant ships from going armed. Bills were also passed to prohibit the exportation of arms, to provide for calling out eighty thousand militia at a moment's notice, to strengthen the fortifications of harbors, and to complete and equip the three frigates which had been built out of the appropriations made for a navy in connection with the Algerine demands. These ships — the United States, the Constitution, and the Constellation — were heavily armed for their size, the first two having forty-four and the third having thirty-six guns. News of their construction caused much merriment among English and French naval officers, who had not yet acquired that respect for Yankee skill which these frigates were destined to do much to establish.
Having thus taken steps to meet hostilities if they should come, and having put forth a last and most formal effort to settle the difficulty amicably, Adams was now in a position to await news from the envoys. The real interests of the country demanded peace: no one could tell what internal catastrophe a French war would bring. Some of the wisest men in the nation believed that in the existing state of feeling, a large part of the people, especially those of the South, would refuse to fight our old ally, and possibly might secede from the Union and enter into an alliance with her. If this danger was not imminent, it was nevertheless evident that much of the feeling for an immediate declaration was pure braggadocio. The country was in no condition for war: it lacked material and organization, and public sentiment was not united. If Adams's course should not lead to peace, it would at least serve to unite the people in an active support of whatever decision might then be made, and it would give time to make necessary preparations. This was the idea of Hamilton, who at this time kept a firm grasp on the situation. "Real firmness," he wrote to Wolcott on June 6, "is good for everything. Strut is good for nothing." Whether his motives were patriotic or prompted by a desire to organize that military establishment which a year later he is known to have so much at heart, his view of the situation in the summer of 1797 was a wise one.
He continually advocated moderation, supporting Adams and restraining the unreasoning zeal of the cabinet group.