THE ANAS.











 INTRODUCTORY NOTE.



The " three volumes bound in marbled paper," to which the introductory "
Explanation " refers, contain the celebrated "Anas," up to the time of
Jefferson's retirement from the Secretaryship of State on January 1st, 1794.
Some of his friends have regretted that they were ever published. However that
may be, they have been published, and it was manifestly the purpose of Mr.
Jefferson that they should be. Late in life, "when the passions of the times
had passed away," he carefully revised them for publication. "At this day," he
says "after the lapse of twenty-five years, or more, from their dates, I have
given to the whole a calm revisal, when the passions of the times are passed
away, and the reasons of the transactions act alone upon the judgment. Some of
the informations I had recorded, are now cut out from the rest, because I have
seen that they were incorrect, or doubtful, or merely personal or private, with
which we have nothing to do. I should, perhaps, not have thought the rest worth
preserving, but for their testimony against the only history of that period,
which pretends to have been compiled from authentic and unpublished documents."
Considering these circumstances, these three volumes of the "Anas" ought not to
be excluded from a publication professing to be a complete edition of the
Writings of Thomas Jefferson. They are accordingly inserted in the form in
which he left them after his last revisal. The supplementary portion of the
"Anas," omitted from the Congressional Edition published in l853, extends from
1797 to 1808 covering many interesting events of Jefferson's first and second
Administrations, while President of the United States.











(264)



THE ANAS.



 EXPLANATION OF THE THREE VOLUMES BOUND IN MARBLED PAPER.



IN these three volumes will be found copies of the official opinions(1) given
in writing by me to General Washington, while I was Secretary of State, with
sometimes the documents belonging to the case. Some of these are the rough
draughts, some press copies, some fair ones. In the earlier part of my acting
in that office, I took no other NOTE of the passing transactions; but after
awhile, I saw the importance of doing it in aid of my memory. Very often,
therefore, I made memorandums on loose scraps of paper, taken out of my pocket
in the moment, and laid by to be copied f air at leisure, which, however, they
hardly ever were. These scraps, therefore, ragged, rubbed, and scribbled as
they were, I had bound with the others by a binder who came into my cabinet,
did it under my own eye, and without the opportunity of reading a single paper.
At this day, after the lapse of twenty-five





        _______________



(1) The opinions here alluded to will be found in the Official Papers of
Jefferson. (265)



266 Jefferson's Works



years, or more, from their dates, I have given to the whole a calm revisal,
when the passions of the time are passed away, and the reasons of the
transactions act alone on the judgment. Some of the informations I had
recorded, are now cut out from the rest, because I have seen that they were
incorrect, or doubtful, or merely personal or private, with which we have
nothing to do. I should perhaps have thought the rest not worth preserving, but
for their testimony against the only history of that period, which pretends to
have been compiled from authentic and unpublished documents. * * * * * * * But
a short review of facts * * * will show, that the contests of that day were
contests of principle, between the advocates of republican, and those oú kingly
government, and that had not the former made the efforts they did, our
government would have been, even at this early day, a very different thing from
what the successful issue of those efforts have made it. The alliance between
the States under the old Articles of Confederation, for the purpose of joint
defence against the aggression of Great Britain, was found insufficient, as
treaties of alliance generally are, to enforce compliance with their mutual
stipulations; and these, once fulfilled, that bond was to expire of itself, and
each State to become sovereign and independent in all things. Yet it could not
but occur to every one, that these separate independ-



The Anas 267



envies, like the petty States of Greece, would be eternally at war with each
other, and would become at length the mere partisans and satellites of the
leading powers of Europe. All then must have looked forward to some further
bond of union, which would insure eternal peace, and a political system of our
own, independent of that of Europe. Whether all should be consolidated into a
single government, or each remain independent as to internal matters, and the
whole form a single nation as to what was foreign only, and whether that
national government should be a monarchy or republic, would oú course divide
opinions, according to the constitutions, the habits, and the circumstances of
each individual. Some officers oú the army; as it has always been said and
believed, (and Steuben and Knox have ever been named as the leading agents,)
trained to monarchy by military habits, are understood to have proposed to
General Washington to decide this great question by the army before its
disbandment, and to assume himself the crown on the assurance of their support.
The indignation with which he is said to have scouted this parricide
proposition was equally worthy of his virtue and wisdom. The next effort was,
(on suggestion of the same individuals, in the moment of their separation,) the
establishment of an hereditary order under the name of the Cincinnati, ready
prepared by that distinction to be ingrafted into the future frame of
government, and placing General Washington still at their head.



268 Jefferson's Works



The General wrote to me on this subject, while I was in Congress at Annapolis,
and an extract from my letter is inserted in 5th Marshall's history, page 28.
He afterwards called on me at that place on his way to a meeting of the
society, and after a whole evening of consultation, he left that place fully
determined to use all his endeavors for its total suppression. But he found it
so firmly riveted in the affections of the members, that, strengthened as they
happened to be by an adventitious occurrence of the moment, he could effect no
more than the abolition of its hereditary principle. He called again on his
return, and explained to me fully the opposition which had been made, the
effect of the occurrence from France, and the difficulty with which its
duration had been limited to the lives of the present members. . Further
details will be found among my papers, in his and my letters, and some in the
Encyclopedia Methodique et Dictionnaire d'Economie Politique, communicated by
myself to M. Meusnier its author, who had made the establishment of this
society the ground, in that work, of a libel on our country. The want of some
authority which should procure justice to the public creditors, and an
observance of treaties with foreign nations, produced, some time after, the
call of a convention of the States at Annapolis. Although, at this meeting, a
difference of opinion was evident on the question of a republican or kingly
government, yet, so general through



The Anas 269



the States was the sentiment in favor of the former, that the friends of the
latter confined themselves to a course of obstruction only, and delay, to
everything proposed ; they hoped, that nothing being done, and all things going
from bad to worse, a kingly government might be usurped, and submitted to by
the people, as better than anarchy and wars internal and external, the certain
consequences of the present want of a general government. The effect of their
maneuvres, with the defective attendance of Deputies from the States, resulted
in the measure of calling a more general convention, to be held at
Philadelphia. At this, the same party exhibited the same practices, and with
the same views of preventing a government of concord, which they foresaw would
be republican, and of forcing through anarchy their way to monarchy. But the
mass of that convention was too honest, too wise, and too steady, to be baffled
and misled by their manoeuvres. One of these was a form of government proposed
by Colonel Hamilton, which would have been in fact a compromise between the two
parties of royalism and republicanism. According to this, the executive and one
branch of the legislature were to be during good behavior, I. e. for life, and
the governors of the States were to be named by these two permanent organs.
This, however, was rejected; on which Hamilton left the convention, as
desperate, and never returned again until near its final conclusion. These
opinions and efforts, secret or avowed, of the



270 Jefferson's Works



advocates for monarchy, had begotten great jealousy through the States
generally; and this jealousy it was which excited the strong opposition to the
conventional constitution; a jealousy which yielded at last only to a general
determination to establish certain amendments as barriers against a government
either monarchical or consolidated. In what passed through the whole period of
these conventions, I have gone on the information of those who were members of
them, being absent myself on my mission to France. I returned from that mission
in the first year of the new government, having landed in Virginia in December,
1789, and proceeded to New York in March, l790, to enter on the office of
Secretary of State. Here, certainly, I found a state of things which, of all I
had ever contemplated, I the least expected. I had left France in the first
year of her revolution, in the fervor of natural rights, and zeal for
reformation. My conscientious devotion to these rights could not be heightened,
but it had been aroused and excited by daily exercise. The President received
me cordially, and my colleagues and the circle of principal citizens apparently
with welcome. The courtesies of dinner parties given me, as a stranger newly
arrived among them, placed me at once in their familiar society. But I cannot
describe the wonder and mortification with which the table conversations filled
me. Politics were the chief topic, and a preference of kingly over republi-



The Anas 271



can government was evidently the favorite sentiment. An apostate I could not
be, nor yet a hypocrite; and I found myself, for the most part, the only
advocate on the republican side of the question, unless among the guests there
chanced to be some member of that party from the legislative Houses. Hamilton's
financial system had then passed. It had two objects ; 1st, as a puzzle, to
exclude popular understanding and inquiry; 2d, as a machine for the corruption
of the legislature; for he avowed the opinion, that man could be governed by
one of two motives only, force or interest; force, he observed, in this country
was out of the question, and the interests, therefore, oú the members must be
laid hold of, to keep the legislative in unison with the executive. And with
grief and shame it must be acknowledged that his machine was not without effect
; that even in this, the birth of our government, some members were found
sordid enough to bend their duty to their interests, and to look after personal
rather than public good. It is well known that during the war the greatest
difficulty we encountered was the want of money or' means to pay our soldiers
who fought, or our farmers, manufacturers and merchants, who furnished the
necessary supplies of food and clothing for them. After the expedient of paper
money had exhausted itself, certificates of debt were given to the individual
creditors, with assurance .of payment so soon as the United States should be
able. But the distresses oú



272 Jefferson's Works



these people often obliged them to part with these for the half, the fifth, and
even a tenth of their value; and speculators had made a trade of cozening them
from the holders by the most fraudulent practices, and persuasions that they
would never be paid. In the bill for funding and paying these, Hamilton made no
difference between the original holders and the fraudulent purchasers of this
paper. Great and just repugnance arose at putting these two classes of
creditors on the same footing, and great exertions were used to pay the former
the full value, and to the latter, the price only which they had paid, with
interest. But this would have prevented the game which was to be played, and
for which the minds of greedy members were already tutored and prepared. When
the trial of strength on these several efforts had indicated the form in which
the bill would finally pass, this being known within doors sooner than without,
and especially, than to those who were in distant parts of the Union, the base
scramble began. Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift sailing pilot
boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners and agents were
associated and employed in every State, town, and country neighborhood, and
this paper was bought up at five shillings, and even as low as two shillings in
the pound, before the holder knew that Congress had already provided for its
redemption at par. Immense sums were thus filched from the poor and ignorant,
and fortunes accumulated by those who had them



The Anas 273



selves been poor enough before. Men thus enriched by the dexterity of a leader,
would follow of course the chief who was leading them to fortune, and become
the zealous instruments of all his enterprises. This game was over, and another
was on the carpet at the moment of my arrival ; and to this I was most
ignorantly and innocently made to hold the candle. This fiscal manoeuvre is
well known by the name of the Assumption. Independently of the debts of
Congress, the States had during the war contracted separate and heavy debts ;
and Massachusetts particularly, in an absurd attempt, absurdly conducted, on
the British post of Penobscot : and the more debt Hamilton could rake up, the
more plunder for his mercenaries. This money, whether wisely or foolishly
spent, was pretended to have been spent for general purposes, and ought,
therefore, to be paid from the general purse. But it was objected, that nobody
knew what these debts were, what their amount, or what their proofs. No matter;
we will guess them to be twenty millions. But of these twenty millions, we do
not know how much should be reimbursed to one State, or how much to another. No
matter; we will guess. And so another scramble was set on foot among the
several States, and some got much, some little, some nothing. But the main
object was obtained, the phalanx of the Treasury was reinforced by additional
recruits. This measure produced the most bitter and angry contest ever known in
Congress,



VOL.. 1-18



274 Jefferson's Works



before or since the Union of the States. I arrived in the midst of it. But a
stranger to the ground, a stranger to the actors on it, so long absent as to
have lost all familiarity with the subject, and as yet unaware of its object, I
took no concern in it. The great and trying question, however, was lost in the
House of Representatives. So high were the feuds excited by this subject, that
on its rejection business was suspended. Congress met and adjourned from day to
day without doing anything, the parties being too much out of temper to do
business together. The eastern members particularly, who, with Smith from South
Carolina, were the principal gamblers in these scenes, threatened a secession
and dissolution. Hamilton was in despair. As I was going to the President's one
day, I met him in the street. He walked me backwards and forwards before the
President's door for half an hour. He painted pathetically the temper into
which the legislature had been wrought; the disgust of those who were called
the creditor States ; the danger of the secession of their members, and the
separation of the States. He observed that the members of the administration
ought to act in concert; that though this question was not of my department,
yet a common duty should make it a common concern; that the President was the
centre on which all administrative questions ultimately rested, and that all of
us should rally around him, and support, with joint efforts, measures approved
by him ; and that the

The Anas 275



question having been lost by a small majority only, it was probable that an
appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of some of my friends, might
effect a change in the vote, and the machine of government, now suspended,
might be again set into. motion. I told him that I was really a stranger to the
whole subject; that not having yet informed myself of the system of finances
adopted, I knew not how far this was a necessary sequence ; that undoubtedly,
if its rejection endangered a dissolution of our Union at this incipient stage,
I should deem that the most unfortunate of all consequences, to avert which all
partial and temporary evils should be yielded. I proposed to him, however, to
dine with me the next day, and I would invite another friend or two, bring them
into conference together, and I thought it impossible that reasonable men,
consulting together coolly, could fail, by some mutual sacrifices of opinion,
to form a compromise which was to save the Union. The discussion took place. I
could take no part in it but an exhortatory one, because I was a stranger to
the circumstances which should govern it. But it was finally agreed, that
whatever importance had been attached to the rejection of this proposition, the
preservation of the Union and of concord among the States was more important,
and that therefore it would be better that the vote of rejection should be
rescinded, to effect which, some members should change their votes. But it was
observed that this



276 Jefferson's Works



pill would be peculiarly bitter to the southern States, and that some
concomitant measure should be adopted, to sweeten it a little to them. There
had before been propositions to fix the seat of government either at
Philadelphia,. or at Georgetown on the Potomac; and it was thought that by
giving it to Philadelphia for ten years, and to Georgetown permanently
afterwards, this might, as an anodyne, calm in some degree the ferment which
might be excited by the other measure alone. So two of the Potomac members
(White and Lee, but White with a revulsion of stomach almost convulsive,)
agreed to change their votes, and Hamilton undertook to carry the other point.
In doing this, the influence he had established over the eastern members, with
the agency of Robert Morris with those of the middle States, effected. his side
of the engagement ; and so the Assumption was passed, and twenty millions of
stock divided among favored States, and thrown in as a pabulum to the
stock-jobbing herd. This added to the number of votaries to the Treasury, and
made its chief the master of every vote in the legislature, which might give to
the government the direction suited to his political views. I know well, and so
must be understood, that nothing like a majority in Congress had yielded to
this corruption. Far from it. But a division, not very unequal, had already
taken place in the honest part of that body; between the parties styled
republican and federal. The latter being monarchists in



The Anas 277



principle, adhered to Hamilton of course, as their leader in that principle,
and this mercenary phalanx added to them, insured him always a majority in both
Houses : so that the whole action of legislature was now under the direction of
the Treasury. Still the machine was not complete. The effect of the funding
system, and of the Assumption, would be temporary; it would be lost with the
loss of the individual members whom it has enriched, and some engine of
influence more permanent must be contrived, while these myrmidons were yet in
place to carry it through all opposition. This engine was the Bank of the
United State's. All that history is known, so I shall say nothing about it.
While the government remained at Philadelphia, a selection of members of both
Houses were constantly kept as directors who, on every question interesting to
that institution, or to the views of the federal head, voted at the will of
that head ; and, together with the stock-holding members, could always make the
federal vote that of the majority. By this combination, legislative expositions
were given to the constitution, and all the administrative laws were shaped on
the model of England, and so passed. And from this influence we were not
relieved, until the removal from the precincts of the bank, to Washington. Here
then was the real ground of the opposition which was made to the course of
administration. Its object was to preserve the legislature pure and



278 Jefferson's Works



independent of the executive, to restrain the administration to republican
forms and principles, and not permit the constitution to be construed into a
monarchy, and to be warped, in practice, into all the principles and pollutions
of their favorite English model. Nor was this an opposition to General
Washington. He was true to the republican charge confided to him; and has
solemnly and repeatedly protested to me, in our conversations, that he would
lose the last drop of his blood in support of it; and he did this the oftener
and with the more earnestness, because he knew my suspicions of Hamilton's
designs against it, and wished to quiet them. For he was not aware of the
drift, or of the effect of Hamilton's schemes. Unversed in financial projects
and calculations and budgets, his approbation of them was bottomed on his
confidence in the man. But Hamilton was not only a monarchist, but for a
monarchy bottomed on corruption. In proof of this, I will relate an anecdote,
for the truth of which I attest the God who made me. Before the President set
out on his southern tour in April, 1791, he addressed a letter of the fourth of
that month, from Mount Vernon, to the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War,
desiring that if any serious and important cases should arise during his
absence, they would consult and act on them. And he requested that the Vice
President should also be consulted. This was the only occasion on which that
officer was ever requested to take part in a cabinet question. Some



The Anas 279



occasion for consultation arising, I invited those gentlemen (and the Attorney
General, as well as I remember,) to dine with me, in order to confer on the
subject. After the cloth was removed, and our question agreed and dismissed,
conversation began on other matters, and by some circumstance, was led to the
British constitution, on which Mr. Adams observed, " purge that constitution of
its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of representation, and
it would be the most perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man."
Hamilton paused and said," purge it of its corruption, and give to its popular
branch equality of representation, and it would become an impracticable
government: as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the
most perfect government which ever existed. " And this was assuredly the exact
line which separated the political creeds of these two gentlemen. The one was
for two hereditary branches and an honest elective one : the other, úor an
hereditary King, with a House of Lords and Commons corrupted to his will, and
standing between him and the people. Hamilton was, indeed, a singular
character. Of acute understanding, disinterested, honest, and honorable in all
private transactions, amiable in society, and duly valuing virtue in private
life, yet so bewitched and perverted by the British example, as to be under
thorough conviction that corruption was essential to the government of a
nation. Mr. Adams had originally been a republican. The glare



280 Jefferson's Works



of royalty and nobility, during his mission to England, had made him believe
their fascination a necessary ingredient in government ; and Shay's rebellion,
not sufficiently understood where he then was, seemed to prove that the absence
of want and oppression, was not a sufficient guarantee of order. His book on
the American constitutions having made known his political bias, he was taken
up by the monarchical federalists in his absence, and on his return to the
United States, he was by them made to believe that the general disposition of
our citizens was favorable to monarchy. He here wrote his " Davila," as a
supplement to a former work, and his election to the Presidency confirmed him
in his errors. Innumerable addresses too, artfully and industriously poured in
upon him, deceived him into a confidence that he was on the pinnacle of
popularity, when the gulf was yawning at his feet, which was to swallow up him
and his deceivers. For when General Washington was withdrawn, these energumeni
of royalism, kept in check hitherto by the dread of his honesty, his firmness,
his patriotism, and the authority of his name, now mounted on the car of State
and free from control, like Phaeton on that of the sun, drove headlong and
wild, looking neither to right nor left, nor regarding anything but the objects
they were driving at; until, displaying these fully, the eyes of the nation
were opened, and a general disbandment of them from the public councils took
place.



The Anas 281



Mr. Adams, I am sure, has been long since convinced of the treacheries with
which he was surrounded during his administration. He has since thoroughly
seen, that his constituents were devoted to republican government, and whether
his judgment is re-settled on its ancient basis, or not, he is conformed as a
good citizen to the will of the majority, and would now, I am persuaded,
maintain its republican structure with the zeal and fidelity belonging to his
character. For even an enemy has said, " he is always an honest man, and often
a great one." But in the fervor of the fury and follies of those who made him
their stalking horse, no man who did not witness it can form an idea of their
unbridled madness, and the terrorism with which they surrounded themselves. The
horrors oú the French revolution, then raging, aided them mainly, and using
that as a raw head and bloody bones, they were enabled by their stratagems of
X. Y. Z. in. which **** was a leading mountebank, their tales of tub-plots,
ocean massacres, bloody buoys, and pulpit lyings and slanderings, and maniacal
ravings of their Gardeners, their Osgoods and parishes, to spread alarm into
all but the firmest breasts. Their Attorney General had the impudence to say to
a republican member, that deportation must be resorted to, of which, said he, "
you republicans have set the example ; " thus daring to identify us with the
murderous Jacobins of France. These transactions, now recollected but as dreams



282 Jefferson's Works

of the night, were then sad realities ; and nothing rescued us from their
liberticide effect, but the unyielding opposition of those firm spirits who
sternly maintained their post in defiance of terror, until their fellow
citizens could be aroused to their own danger, and rally and rescue the
standard of the constitution. This has been happily done. Federalism and
monarchism have languished from that moment, until their treasonable
combinations with the enemies of their country during the late war, their plots
of dismembering the Union, and their Hartford convention, have consigned them
to the tomb of the dead ; and I fondly hope, " we may now truly say, we are all
republicans, all federalists " and that the motto of the standard to which our
country will forever rally, will be, "federal union and republican government ;
" and sure I am we may say, that we are indebted for the preservation of this
point of ralliance, to that opposition of which so injurious an idea is so
artfully insinuated and excited in this history. Much of this relation is
notorious to the world; and many intimate proofs of it will be found in these
notes. From the moment where they end, of my retiring from the administration,
the federalists(1) got unchecked hold of General Washington. His memory was
already sensibly impaired by age, the firm tone of mind for which he had been
remarkable; was beginning to relax, its energy was abated, a



         _______________



(1) See conversation with General Washington, October 1.



The Anas 283



listlessness of labor, a desire for tranquillity had crept on him, and a
willingness to let others act, and even think for him. Like the rest of
mankind, he was disgusted with atrocities of the French revolution, and was not
sufficiently aware of the difference between the rabble who were used as
instruments of their perpetration, and the steady and rational character of the
American people, in which he had not sufficient confidence. The opposition too
of the republicans to the British treaty, and the zealous support of the
federalists in that unpopular but favorite measure of theirs, had made him all
their own. Understanding, moreover, that I disapproved of that treaty, and
copiously nourished with falsehoods by a malignant neighbor of mine, who
ambitioned to be his correspondent, he had become alienated from myself
personally, as from the republican body generally of his fellow-citizens; and
he wrote the letters to Mr. Adams and Mr. Carroll, over which, in devotion to
his imperishable fame, we must forever weep as monuments of mortal decay.
February 4th, 1818.



 CONVERSATION WITH ALEXANDER HAMILTON. August the 13th, 1791. Notes of a
conversation between Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. Th : Jefferson
mentioned to him a letter received from John Adams, disavowing Publicola, and
denying that he ever entertained a wish to bring this country under an
hereditary executive, or introduce



284 Jefferson's Works



an hereditary branch of Legislature, &c. See his letter. Alexander Hamilton
condemning Mr. Adams' writings, and most particularly "Davila," as having a
tendency to weaken the present government, declared in substance as follows: "
I own it is my own opinion, though I do not publish it in Dan or Bersheba, that
the present government is not that which will answer the ends of society, by
giving stability and protection to its rights, and that it will probably be
found expedient to go into the British form. However, since we have undertaken
the experiment, I am for giving it a fair course, whatever my expectations may
be. The success, indeed, so far, is greater than I had expected, and therefore,
at present, success seems more possible than it had done heretofore, and there
are still other and other stages of improvement which, if the present does not
succeed, may be tried, and ought to be tried, before we give up the republican
form altogether; for that mind must be really depraved, which would not prefer
the equality of political rights, which is the foundation of pure
republicanism, if it can be obtained consistently with order. Therefore,
whoever by his writings disturbs the present order of things, is really
blameable, however pure his intentions may be, and he was sure Mr. Adams' were
pure. " This is the substance of a declaration made in much more lengthy terms,
and which seemed to be more formal than usual for a private conversation
between two, and as if intended to qualify some less



The Anas 285



guarded expressions which had been dropped on former occasions. Th: Jefferson
has committed it to writing in the moment of A. Hamilton's leaving the room.







December the 25th, 1791, Colonel Gunn (of Georgia) dining the other day with
Colonel Hamilton, said to him, with that plain freedom he is known to use, "I
wish, Sir you would advise our friend King, to observe some kind of consistency
in his votes. There has been scarcely a question before the Senate on which he
has not voted both ways. On the representation bill, for instance, he first
voted for the proposition of the Representatives, and ultimately voted against
it." " Why," said Colonel Hamilton, " I'll tell you as to that, Colonel Gunn,
that it never Was intended that bill should pass." Gunn told this to Butler,
who told it to Th: Jefferson.



 CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.



February the 28th, l792. I was to have' been with him long enough before three
o'clock, (which was the hour and day he received visits,) to have opened to him
a proposition for doubling the velocity of the post riders, who now travel
about fifty miles a day, and might, without difficulty, go one hundred, and for
taking measures (by way bills) to know where the delay is, when there is any. I
was



286 Jefferson's Works



delayed by business, so as to have scarcely time to give him the outlines. I
ran over them rapidly, and observed afterwards, that I had hitherto never
spoken to him on the subject of the post office, not knowing whether it was
considered as a revenue law; or a law for the general accommodation of the
citizens : that the law just passed seemed to have removed the doubt; by
declaring that the whole profits of the office should be applied to extending
the posts, and that even the past profits should be refunded by the treasury
for the same purpose: that I therefore conceive it was now in the department of
the Secretary of State : that I thought it would be advantageous so to declare
it for another reason, to wit : that the department of the Treasury possessed
already such an influence as to swallow up the whole executive powers, and that
even the future Presidents (not supported by the weight of character which
himself possessed,) would not be able to make head against: this department.
That in urging this measure I had certainly no personal interest, since, if I
was supposed to have any appetite for power, yet as my career would certainly
be exactly as short as his own, the intervening time was too short to be an
object. My real wish was to avail the public of every occasion, during the
residue of the President's period, to place things on a safe footing. He was
now called on to attend his company, and he desired me to come and breakfast
with him the next morning.



The Anas 287



February the 29th. I did so; and after breakfast we retired to his room, and I
unfolded my plan for the post office, and after such an approbation of it as he
usually permitted himself on the first presentment of any idea, and desiring me
to commit it to writing, he, during that pause of conversation which follows a
business closed, said in an affectionate tone, that he had felt much concern at
an expression which dropped from me yesterday, and which marked my intention of
retiring when he should. That as to himself, many motives obliged him to it. He
had, through the whole course of the war, and most particularly at the close of
it, uniformly declared his resolution to retire from public affairs, and never
to act in any public office; that he had retired under that firm resolution :
that the government, however, which had been formed, being found evidently too
inefficacious, and it being supposed that his aid was of some consequence
towards bringing the people to consent to one of sufficient efficacy for their
own good, he consented to come into the convention, and on the same motive,
after much pressing, to take a part in the new government, and get it under
way. That were he to continue longer, it might give room to say, that having
tasted the sweets of office, he could not do without them : that he really felt
himself growing old, his bodily health less firm, his memory, always bad,
becoming worse, and perhaps the other faculties of his mind 'showing a decay to
others of which he was insensible himself ;



288 Jefferson's Works



that this apprehension particularly oppressed him: that he found, moreover, his
activity lessened, business therefore more irksome, and tranquillity and
retirement become an irresistible passion. That however he felt himself
obliged, for these reasons, to retire from the government, yet he should
consider it as unfortunate, if that should bring on the retirement of the great
officers of the government, and that this might produce a shock on the public
mind of dangerous consequence. I told him that no man had ever had less desire
of entering into public offices than myself ; that the circumstance of a
perilous war, which brought every thing into danger, and called for all the
services which every citizen could render, had induced me to undertake the
administration of the government of Virginia; that I had both before and after
refused repeated appointments of Congress to go abroad in that sort of office,
which, if I had consulted my own gratification, would almost have been the most
agreeable to me; that at the end of two years, I resigned the government of
Virginia, and retired with a firm resolution never more to appear in public
life; that a domestic loss, however, happened, and made me fancy that absence
and a change of scene for a time might be expedient for me; that I therefore
accepted a foreign appointment, limited to two years ; that at the close of
that, Doctor Franklin having left France, I was appointed to supply his place,
which I had accepted,



The Anas 289



and though I continued in it three or four years, it was under the constant
idea of remaining only a year or two longer ; that the revolution in France
coming on, I had so lnterested myself in the event of that, that when obliged
to bring my family home, I had still an idea of returning and awaiting the
close of that, to fix the era of my final retirement; that on my arrival here I
found he had appointed me to my present office ; that he knew I had not come
into it without some reluctance; that it was, on my part, a sacrifice of
inclination to the opinion that I might be more serviceable here than in
France, and with a firm resolution in my mind, to indulge my constant wish for
retirement at no very distant



 day that when, therefore, I had received his letter, written from Mount
Vernon, on his way to Carolina and Georgia, (April the 1st, 1791) and
discovered, from an expression in that, that he meant to retire from the
government ere long, and as to the precise epoch there could be no doubt, my
mind was immediately made up, to make that the epoch of my own retirement from.
those labors of which I was heartily tired. That, however, I did not believe
there was any idea in any of my brethren in the administration of retiring;
that on the contrary, I had perceived at a late meeting of the trustees of the
sinking fund, that the Secretary of the Treasury had developed the plan he
intended to pursue, and that it embraced years in its view. He said; that he
considered the Treasury depart-

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290 Jefferson's Works



ment as a much more limited one, going only to the single object of revenue,
while that of the Secretary of State, embracing nearly all the objects of
administration, was much more important, and the retirement of the officer
therefore, would be more noticed: that though the government had set out with a
pretty general good will of the public, yet that symptoms of dissatisfaction
had lately shown themselves far beyond what he could have expected, and to what
height these might arise, in case of too great a change in the administration,
could not be foreseen. I told him, that in my opinion, there was only a single
source of these discontents. Though they had indeed appeared to spread
themselves over the War department also, yet I considered that as an
overflowing only from their real channel, which would never have taken place,
if they had not first been generated in another department, to wit, that of the
Treasury. That a system had there been contrived, for deluging the States with
-paper money instead of gold and silver, for withdrawing our citizens from the
pursuits of commerce, manufactures, buildings, and other branches of useful
industry, to occupy themselves and their capitals in a species of gambling,
destructive of morality, and which had introduced its poison into the
government itself. That it was a fact,. as certainly known as that he and I
were then conversing, that particular members of the legislature, while those
laws were on the carpet, had feathered their nests with paper,



The Anas 291



had then voted for the laws, and constantly since lent all the energy of their
talents, and instrumentality of their offices, to the establishment and
enlargement of this system; that they had chained it about our necks for a
great length of time, and in order to keep the game in their hands had, from
time to time, aided in making such legislative constructions of the
constitution, as made it a very different thing from what the people thought
they had submitted to; that .they had now brought forward a proposition far
beyond any one ever yet advanced, and to which the eyes of many were turned, as
the decision which was to let us know, whether we live under a limited or an
unlimited government. He asked me to what proposition I alluded? I answered, to
that in the report on manufactures, which, under color of giving bounties for
the encouragement of particular manufactures, meant to establish the doctrine,
that the power given by the constitution to collect taxes to provide f or the
general welfare of the United States, permitted Congress to take everything
under their management which they should deem for the public welfare, and which
is susceptible oú the application of money; consequently, that the subsequent
enumeration of their powers was not the description to which resort must be
had, and did not at all constitute the limits of their authority ; that this
was a very different question from that of the bank, which was thought an
incident to an enumerated



292 Jefferson's Works



power; that, therefore, this decision was expected with great anxiety ; that,
indeed, I hoped the proposition would be rejected, believing there was a
majority in both Houses against it; and that if it should be, it would be
considered as a proof that things were returning into their true channel ; and
that, at any rate, I looked forward to the broad representation which would
shortly take place, for keeping the general constitution on its true ground ;
and that this would remove a great deal of the discontent which had shown
itself. The conversation ended with this last topic. It is here stated nearly
as much at length as it really was; the expressions preserved where I could
recollect them; and their substance always faithfully stated. March 1, 1792.



On the 2d of January, 1792, Messrs. Fitzsimmons and Gerry (among others) dined
with me. These two staid, with a Mr. Larned of Connecticut, after the company
was gone. We got on the subject oú references by the legislature to the Heads
of departments, considering their mischief in every direction. Gerry and
Fitzsimmons clearly opposed to them. Two days afterwards (January the 9th), Mr.
Bourne from Rhode Island presented a memorial from his State, complaining of
inequality in the Assumption, and moved to refer it to the Secretary of the
Treasury. Fitzsimmons, Gerry and others opposed it; but it Was carried.



The Anas 293



January the 19th. Fitzsimmons moved, that the President of the United States be
requested to direct the Secretary of the Treasury, to lay before the House
information to enable the legislature to judge of the additional revenue
necessary on the increase of the military establishment. The House, on debate,
struck out the words, " President of the United States." March the 7th. The
subject resumed. An animated debate took place on the tendency of references to
the Heads of departments ; and it seemed that a great majority would be against
it; the House adjourned. Treasury greatly alarmed, and much industry supposed
to be used before next morning, when it was brought on again, and debated
through the day, and on the question, the Treasury carried it by thirty-one to
twenty-seven; but deeply wounded, since it was seen that all Pennsylvania,
except Jacobs, voted against the reference; that Tucker of South Carolina voted
for it, and Sumpter absented himself, debauched for the moment only, because of
the connection of the question with a further Assumption which South Carolina
favored; but showing that they never were to be counted on among the Treasury
votes. Some others absented themselves. Gerry changed sides. On the whole, it
showed that Treasury influence was tottering.



Committed to writing this 10th of March, 1792.



294 Jefferson's Works



March the 11th, 1792. Consulted verbally by the President, on whom a committee
of the Senate (Izard, Morris, and King) are to wait to-morrow morning, to know
whether he will think it proper to redeem our Algerine captives, and make a
treaty with the Algerines, on the single vote of the Senate, without taking
that of the Representatives. My opinions run on the following heads : We must
go to Algiers with cash in our hands. Where shall we get it? By loan? By
converting money now in the treasury ? Probably a loan might be obtained on the
President's authority; but as this could not be repaid without a subsequent act
of legislature, the Representatives might refuse it. So if money in the
treasury be converted, they may refuse to sanction it. The subsequent
approbation of the Senate being necessary to validate a treaty, they expect to
be consulted beforehand, if the case admits. So the subsequent act of the
Representatives being necessary where money is given, why should not they
expect to be consulted in like manner, when the case admits. A treaty is a law
of the land. But prudence will point out this difference to be attended to in
making them; viz. where a treaty contains such articles only as will go into
execution of themselves, or be carried into execution by the judges, they may
be safely made; but where there are articles which require a law to be passed
afterwards by the legislature, great caution is requisite.



The Anas 295



For example ; the consular convention with France required a very small
legislative regulation. This convention was unanimously ratified by the Senate.
Yet the same identical men threw by the law to enforce it at the last session,
and the Representatives at this session have placed it among the laws which
they may take up or not, at their own convenience, as if that was a higher
motive than the public faith: Therefore, against hazarding this transaction
without the sanction of both Houses. The President concurred. The Senate
express the motive for this proposition, to be a fear that the Representatives
would not keep the secret. He has no opinion of the secrecy of the Senate. In
this very case, Mr. Izard made the communication to him, sitting next to him at
table, on one hand, while a lady (Mrs. McLane) was on his other hand, and the
French minister next to her; and as Mr. Izard got on with his communication,
his voice kept rising, and his stutter bolting the words out loudly at
intervals, so that the minister might hear if he would. He said he had a great
mind at one time to have got up in order to put a stop to Mr. Izard.



 March the 11th, 1792. Mr. Sterret tells me, that sitting round a fire the
other day with four or five others, [Mr. Smith of South Carolina was one],
some- body mentioned that the murderers of Hogeboom,



296 Jefferson's Works



sheriff of Columbia county, New York, were acquitted. "Aye," says Smith, "this
is what comes of your damned trial by jury."



1791. Towards the latter end of November, Hamilton had drawn Ternant into a
conversation on the subject of the treaty of commerce recommended by the
National Assembly of France to be negotiated with us, and, as he had no ready
instructions on the subject, he led him into a proposal that Ternant should
take the thing up as a volunteer with me, that we should arrange conditions,
and let them go for confirmation or refusal. Hamilton communicated this to the
President, who came into it, and proposed it to me. I disapproved of it,
observing, that such a volunteer .project would be binding on us, and not them;
that it would enable them to find out how far we would go, and avail themselves
of it. However, the President thought it worth trying, and I acquiesced. I
prepared a plan of treaty for exchanging the privileges of native subjects, and
fixing all duties forever as they now stood. Hamilton did not like this way of
fixing the duties, because, he said, many articles here would bear to be
raised, and therefore, he would prepare a tariff. He did so, raising duties for
the French, from twenty-five to fifty per cent. So they were to give us the
privileges of native subjects, and we, as a compensation, were to make them pay
higher duties. Hamilton, having made his arrangements with Ham



The Anas 297



mond to pretend that though he had no powers to conclude a treaty of commerce,
yet his general commission authorized him to enter into the discussion of one,
then proposed to the President at one of our meetings, that the business should
be taken up with Hammond in the same informal way. I now discovered the trap
which he had laid, by first getting the President into that step with Ternant.
I opposed the thing warmly. Hamilton observed, if we did it with Ternant we
should also with Hammond. The President thought this reasonable. I desired him
to recollect, I had been against it with Ternant, and only acquiesced under his
opinion. So the matter went off as to both. His scheme evidently was, to get us
engaged first with Ternant, merely that he might have a pretext to engage us on
the same ground with Hammond, taking care, at the same time, by an extravagant
tariff, to render it ' impossible we should come to any conclusion with Ternant
: probably meaning, at the same time, to propose terms so favorable to Great
Britain, as would attach us to that country by treaty. On one of those
occasions he asserted, that our commerce with Great Britain and her colonies
was put on a much more favorable footing than with France and her colonies. I
therefore prepared the tabular comparative view of the footing of our commerce
with those nations, which see among my papers. See also my project of a treaty
and Hamilton's tariff. Committed to writing March the 11th, l792.

298 Jefferson's Works



It was observable, that whenever, at any of our consultations, anything was
proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready something which Mr.
Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the subject and proved the
intimacy of their communications ; insomuch, that I believe he communicated to
Hammond all our views, and knew from him, in return, the views of the British
court. Many evidences of this occurred; I will state some. I delivered to the
President my report of instructions for Carmichael and Short, on the subject of
navigation, boundary and commerce, and desired him to submit it to Hamilton.
Hamilton made several just criticisms on different parts of it. But where I
asserted that the United States had no right to alienate an inch of the
territory of any State, he attacked and denied the doctrine. See my report, his
NOTE, and my answer. A few days after came to hand Kirkland's letter, informing
us that the British, at Niagara, expected to run a new line between themselves
and us; and the reports of Pond and Stedman, informing us it was understood at
Niagara, that Captain Stevenson had been sent here by Simcoe to settle that
plan with Hammond. Hence Hamilton's attack of the principle I had laid down, in
order to prepare the way for this new line. See minute of March the 9th.
Another proof. At one of our consultations, about the last of December, I
mentioned that I wished to give in my report on commerce, in which I could not
avoid recommending a commercial



The Anas 299



retaliation against Great Britain. Hamilton opposed it violently ; and among
other arguments, observed, that it was of more importance to us to have the
posts than to commence a commercial war; that this, and this alone, would free
us from the expense of the Indian wars; that it would therefore be the height
of imprudence in us, while treating f or the surrender of the posts, to engage
in anything which would irritate them; that if we did so, they would naturally
say, " these people mean war, let us therefore hold what we have in our hands."
This argument struck me forcibly, and I said, " if there is a hope of obtaining
the posts, I agree it would be imprudent to risk that hope by a commercial
retaliation. I will, therefore, wait till Mr. Hammond gives me in his
assignment of breaches, and if that gives a glimmering of hope that they mean
to surrender the posts, I will not give in my report till the next session."
Now, Hammond had received my assignment of breaches on the l5th of December,
and about the 22d or 23d had made me an apology for not having been able to
send me his counter-assignment of breaches ; but in terms which showed I might
expect it in a few days. From the moment it escaped my lips in the presence of
Hamilton, that I would not give in my report till I should see Hammond's
counter-complaint, and judge if there was a hope of the posts, Hammond never
said a word to me on any occasion, as to the time he should be ready. At length
the President



300 Jefferson's Works



got out of patience, and insisted I should jog him. This I did on the 21st of
February, at the President's assembly : he immediately promised I should have
it in a few days, and accordingly, on the 5th of March I received it.



Written March the llth, 1792.

 March the 12th, 1792. Sent for by the President, and desired to bring the
letter he had signed to the King of France. Went. He said the House of
Representatives had, on Saturday, taken up the communication he had made of the
King's letter to him, and come to a vote in their own name; that he did not
expect this when he sent this message and€ the letter, otherwise he would have
sent the message without the letter, as I had proposed. That he apprehended the
legislature would be endeavoring to invade the executive. I told him, I had
understood the House had resolved to request him to join their congratulations
to his on the completion and acceptance of the constitution; on which part of
the vote, there were only two dissentients, (Barnwell and Benson;) that the
vote was thirty-five to sixteen on that part which expressed an approbation of
the wisdom of the constitution; that in the letter he had signed, I had avoided
saying a word in approbation of the constitution, not knowing whether the King,
in his heart, approved it: Why, indeed, said he, I begin to doubt very much



The Anas 301



of the affairs of France; there are papers from London as late as the 10th of
January, which represent them as going into confusion. He read over the letter
he had signed, found there was not a word which could commit his judgment about
the constitution, and gave it to me back again. This is one of many proofs I
have had, of his want of confidence in the event of the French revolution. The
fact is, that Gouverneur Morris, a high-flying monarchy man,' shutting his eyes
and his faith to every fact against his wishes, and believing everything he
desires to be true, has kept the President's mind constantly poisoned with his
forebodings. That the President wishes the revolution may be established, I
believe from several indications. I remember, when I received the news of the
King's flight and capture, I first told him of it at his assembly. I never saw
him so much dejected by any event in my life. He expressed clearly, on this
occasion, his disapprobation of the legislature referring things to the Heads
of Departments. Written March the 12th.



Eodem die. Ten o'clock, A. M. The preceding was about nine o'clock. The
President now sends Lear to me, to ask what answer he shall give to the
committee, and particularly, whether he shall add to it, that, " in making the
communication, it was not his expectation that the House should give any
answer." I told Mr. Lear that I thought the House



302 Jefferson's Works



had a right, independently of legislation, to express sentiments on other
subjects. That when these subjects did not belong to any other branch
particularly, they would publish them by their own authority; that in the
present case, which respected a foreign nation, the President being the organ
of our nation with other nations, the House would satisfy their duty, if,
instead of a direct communication, they should pass their sentiments through
the President; that if expressing a sentiment were really an invasion of the
executive power, it was so faint a one, that it would be difficult to
demonstrate it to the public, and to a public partial to the French revolution,
and not disposed to consider the approbation of it from any quarter as
improper. That the Senate, indeed, had given many indications of their wish to
invade the executive power: the Representatives had done it in one case, which
was indeed mischievous and alarming; that of giving orders to the Heads of the
Executive Departments, without consulting the President; but that the late vote
for directing the Secretary of the Treasury to report ways and means, though
carried, was carried by so small a majority, and with the aid of members so
notoriously under a local influence on that question, as to give a hope that
the practice would be arrested, and the constitutional course be taken up, of
asking the President to have information laid before them. But that in the
present instance, it was so far from being clearly an invasion of the
Executive, and would



The Anas 303



be so little approved by the general voice, that I could not advise the
President to express any dissatisfaction at the vote of the House; and I gave
Lear, in writing, what I thought should be his answers. See it.



 CABINET MEETINGS.



March the 31st. A meeting at the President's; present, Thomas Jefferson,
Alexander Hamilton, Henry Knox and Edmond Randolph. The subject was the
resolution oú the House of Representatives, of March the 27th, to appoint a
committee to inquire into the causes of the failure of the late expedition
under Major General St. Clair, with the power to call for such persons, papers
and records, as may be necessary to assist their inquiries. The committee had
written to Knox for the original letters, instructions, &c. The President had
called us to consult, merely because it was the first example, and he wished
that so far as it should become a precedent, it should be rightly conducted. He
neither acknowledged nor denied, nor even doubted the propriety of what the
House were doing, for he had not thought upon it, nor was acquainted with
subjects of this kind : he could readily conceive there might be papers of so
secret a nature, as that they ought not to be given up. We were not prepared,
and wished time to think and inquire. April the 2d. Met again at the
President's, on the same subject. We had all considered, and were



304 Jefferson's Works



of one mind, first, that the House was an inquest, and therefore might
institute inquiries. Second, that it might call for papers generally. Third,
that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as the public good would
permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which would injure the
public : consequently were to exercise a discretion. Fourth, that neither the
committee nor House had a right to call on the Head of a Department, who and
whose papers were under the President alone; but that the committee should
instruct their chairman to move the House to address the President. We had
principally consulted the proceedings of the Commons in the case of Sir Robert
Walpole, 13 Chandler's Debates. For the first point, see pages 161, 170, 172,
183, 187, 207; for the second, pages 153, 173, 207; for the third, 81, 173,
appendix page 44; fourth, page 246. NOTE; Hamilton agreed with us in all these
points, except as to the power oú the House to call on Heads of Departments. He
observed, that as to his Department, the act constituting it had made it
subject to Congress in some points, but he thought himself not so far subject,
as to be obliged to produce all the papers they might call for. They might
demand secrets oú a very mischievous nature. [Here I thought he began to fear
they would go on to examining how far their own members. and other persons in
the government had been dabbling in stocks, banks, &c., and that he probably
would choose in this case to deny their



The Anas 305



power; and, in short, he endeavored to place himself subject to the House, when
the Executive should propose what he did not like, and subject to the
Executive, when the House should propose anything disagreeable.] I observed
here a difference between the British Parliament and our Congress ; that the
former was a legislature, an inquest, and a council (S. G. page 91.) for the
King. The latter was, by the constitution, a legislature and an inquest, but
not a council. Finally agreed, to speak separately to the members of the
committee, and bring them by persuasion into the right channel. It was agreed
in this case, that there was not a paper which might not be properly produced;
that copies only should be sent, with an assurance, that if they should desire
it, a clerk should attend with the originals to be verified by themselves. The
committee were Fitzsimmons, Steele, Mercer, Clarke, Sedgwick, Giles and Vining.







April the 9th, l792. The President had wished to redeem our captives at
Algiers, and to make peace with them on paying an annual tribute. The Senate
were willing to approve this, but unwilling to have the lower House applied to
previously to furnish the money; they wished the President to take the money
from the treasury, or open a loan for it. They thought that to consult the
Representatives on one occasion, would give them a handle always to claim



VOL.. 1-20



306 Jefferson's Works



it, and would let them into a participation of the power of making treaties,
which the Constitution had given exclusively to the President and Senate. They
said too, that if the-particular sum was voted by the Representatives, it would
not be a secret. The President had no confidence in the secrecy of the Senate,
and did not choose to take money from the Treasury or to borrow. But he agreed
he would enter into provisional treaties with the Algerines, not to be binding
on us till ratified here. I prepared questions for consultation with the
Senate, and added, that the Senate were to be apprized, that on the return of
the provisional treaty, and after they should advise the ratification, he would
not have the seal put to it till the two Houses should vote the money. He asked
me, if the treaty stipulating a sum and ratified by him, with the advice of the
Senate, would not be good under the Constitution, and obligatory on the
Representatives to furnish the money? I answered it certainly would, and that
it would be the duty of the Representatives to raise the money; but that they
might decline to do what was their duty, and I thought it might be incautious
to commit himself by a ratification with a foreign nation, where he might be
left in the lurch in the execution: it was possible too, to conceive a treaty,
which it would not be their duty to provide for. He said that he did not like
throwing too much into democratic hands, that if they would not do what the
Constitution called on them to do, the Government



The Anas 307



would be at an end, and must then assume another form. He stopped here ; and I
kept silence to see whether he would say anything more in the same line, or add
any qualifying expression to soúten what he had said; but he did neither. I had
observed, that wherever the agency of either, or both Houses would be requisite
subsequent to a treaty, to carry it into effect, it would be prudent to consult
them previously, if the occasion admitted. That thus it was, we were in the
habit of consulting the Senate previously, when the occasion permitted, because
their subsequent ratification would be necessary. That there was the same
reason for consulting the lower House previously, where they were to be called
on afterwards, and especially in the case of money, as they held the purse
strings, and would be jealous of them. However, he desired me to strike out the
intimation that the seal would not be put till both Houses should have voted
the money.



 April the 6th. The President called on me before breakfast, and first
introduced some other matter, then fell on the representation bill, which he
had now in his possession for the tenth day. I had before given him my opinion
in writing, that the method oú apportionment was contrary to the Constitution.
He agreed that it was contrary to the common understanding of that instrument,
and to what was understood at the time by the makers of it ; that yet it



308 Jefferson's Works



would bear the construction which the bill put, and he observed that the vote
for and against the bill was perfectly geographical, a northern against a
southern vote, and he feared he should be thought to be taking side with a
southern party. I admitted the motive of delicacy, but that it should not
induce him to do wrong; urged the dangers to which the scramble for the
fractionary members would always lead. He here expressed his fear that there
would, ere long, be a separation of the Union ; that the public mind seemed
dissatisfied and tending to this. He went home, sent for Randolph, the Attorney
General, desired him to get Mr. Madison immediately and come to me, and if we
three concurred in opinion that he should negative the bill, he desired to hear
nothing more about it, but that we would draw the instrument for him to sign.
They came. Our minds had been before made up. We drew the instrument. Randolph
carried it to him, and told him we all concurred in it. He walked with him to
the door, and as if he still wished to get off, he said, " and you say you
approve of this yourself. " " Yes Sir, " said Randolph, " I do upon my honor. "
He sent it to the House of Representatives instantly. A few of the hottest
friends of the bill expressed passion, but the majority were satisfied, and
both in and out of doors it gave pleasure to have, at length, an instance of
the negative being exercised. Written this the 9th of April.



The Anas 309



July the 10th, 1792. My letter of to the President, directed to him at Mount
Vernon, had not found him there, but came to him here. He told me of this, and
that he would take an occasion of speaking with me on the subject. He did so
this day. He began by observing that he had put it off from day to day, because
the subject was painful, to wit, his remaining in office, which that letter
solicited. He said that the declaration he had made when he quitted his
military command, of never again entering into public life, was sincere. That,
however, when he was called on to come forward to set the present government in
motion, it appeared to him that circumstances were so changed as to justify a
change in his resolution: he was made to believe that in two years all would be
well in motion, and he might retire. At the end of two years he found some
things still to be done. At the end of the third year, he thought it was not
worth while to disturb the course of things, as in one year more his office
would expire, and he was decided then to retire. Now he was told there would
still be danger in it. Certainly, if he thought so, he would conquer his
longing for retirement. But he feared it would be said his former professions
of retirement had been mere affectation, and that he was like other men, when
once in office he could not quit it, He was sensible, too, of a decay of his
hearing, perhaps his other faculties might f all off and he not be sensible of
it. That with respect to the existing



310 Jefferson's Works



causes of uneasiness, he thought there were suspicions against a, particular
party, which had been carried a great deal too far; there might be desires, but
he did not believe there were designs to change the form of government into a
monarchy; that there might be a few who wished it in the higher walks of life,
particularly in the great cities, but that the main body of the people in the
eastern States were as steadily for republicanism as in the southern. That the
pieces lately published, and particularly in Freneau's paper, seemed to have in
view the exciting opposition to the Government. That this had taken place in
Pennsylvania as to the excise law, according to information he had received
from General Hand. That they tended to produce a separation of the Union, the
most dreadful of all calamities, and that whatever tended to produce anarchy,
tended, of course, to produce a resort to monarchical government. He considered
those papers as attacking him directly, for he must be a fool indeed to swallow
the little sugar plums here and there thrown out to him. That in condemning the
administration of the Government, they condemned him, for if they thought there
were measures pursued contrary to his sentiments, they must conceive him too
careless to attend to them, or too stupid to understand them. That though,
indeed, he had signed many acts which he did not approve in all their parts,
yet he had never put his name to one which he did not think, on the whole, was
eligible. That as to



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the bank, which had been an act of so much complaint, until there was some
infallible criterion of reason, a difference of opinion must be tolerated. He
did not believe the discontents extended far from the seat of Government. He
had seen and spoken with many people in Maryland and Virginia in his late
journey. He found the people contented and happy. He wished, however, to be
better informed on this head. If the discontents were more extensive than he
supposed, it might be that the desire that he should remain in the Government
was not general. My observations to him tended principally to enforce the
topics of my letter. I will not, therefore, repeat them, except where they
produced observations from him. I said that the two great complaints were, that
the national debt was unnecessarily increased, and that it had furnished the
means of corrupting both branches of the legislature; that he must know, and
everybody knew, there was a considerable squadron in both, whose votes were
devoted to the paper and stock-jobbing interest, that the names of a weighty
number were known, and several others suspected on good grounds. That on
examining the votes of these men, they would be found uniformly for every
Treasury measure, and that as most of these measures had been carried by small
majorities, they were carried by these very votes. That, therefore, it was a
cause of just uneasiness, when we saw a legislature legislating for their



312 Jefferson's Works



own interests, in opposition to those of the people. He said not a word on the
corruption of the legislature, but took up the other point, defended the
Assumption, and argued that it had not increased the debt, for that all of it
was honest debt. He justified the excise law, as one of the best laws which
could be passed, as nobody would pay the tax who did not choose to do it. With
respect to the increase of the debt by the Assumption, I observed to him that
what was meant and objected to was, that it increased the debt of the General
Government, and carried it beyond the possibility of payment. That if the
balances had been settled, and the debtor States directed to pay their
deficiencies to the creditor States, they would have done it easily, and by
resources of taxation in their power, and acceptable to the people; by a direct
tax in the south, and an excise in the north. Still, he said, it would be paid
by the people. Finding him decided, I avoided entering into argument with him
on those points.



 Sept. the 30th, 1792. The constitution as agreed to till a fortnight before
the Convention rose, was such a one as he would have set his hand and heart to.
lst. The President was to be elected for seven years. Then ineligible for seven
years more. ad. Rotation in the Senate. 3d. A vote of two-thirds in the
legislature on particular subjects, and expressly on that of navigation. The
three New England



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States were constantly with us in all questions (Rhode Island not there, and
New York seldom), so that it was these three States, with the five southern
ones, against Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. With respect to the
importation of slaves, it was left to Congress. This disturbed the two
southernmost States, who knew that Congress would immediately suppress the
importation of slaves. These two States, therefore, struck up a bargain with
the three New England States. If they would join to admit slaves for some
years, the southernmost States would join in changing the clause which required
two-thirds of the legislature in any vote. It was done. These articles were
changed accordingly, and from that moment the two southernmost States, and the
three northern ones, joined Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, and made the
majority eight to three against us, instead of eight to three for us, as it had
been through the whole Convention. Under this coalition, the great principles
of the constitution were changed in the last days of the Convention.' Anecdote.
Yates, Lawsing and Hamilton represented New York. Yates and Lawsing never voted
in one single instance with Hamilton, who was so much mortified at it that he
went home. When the season for courts came on, Yates, a judge, and Lawsing, a
lawyer, went to attend their courts. Then Hamilton returned.



314 Jefferson's Works



ANECDOTE. The constitution as agreed at first was, that amendments might be
proposed either by Congress or the legislatures. A committee was appointed to
digest and redraw. Gouverneur Morris and King were of the committee. One
morning Gouverneur Morris moved an instrument for certain alterations (not
one-half the members yet come in). In a hurry and without understanding, it was
agreed to. The committee reported so that Congress should have the exclusive
power of proposing amendments. George Mason observed it on the report, and
opposed it. King denied the construction. Mason demonstrated it, and asked the
committee by what authority they had varied what had been agreed. Gouverneur
Morris then imprudently got up, and said, by authority of the Convention, and
produced the blind instruction before mentioned, which was unknown by one-half
of the House, and not till then understood by the other. They then restored it,
as it originally stood. He said he considered Hamilton as having done us more
injury than Great Britain and all her fleets and armies. That his (Mason's)
plan oú settling our debts would have been something in this way. He would have
laid as much tax as could be paid without oppressing the people ;-particularly
he would have laid an impost of about the amount of the first, laid by
Congress, but somewhat different in several of its articles. He would have
suspended all application of it one year, during which an office should have



The Anas 315



been open to register unalienated certificates. At the end of the year he would
have appropriated his revenue. lst. To pay the civil list. ad. The interest of
these certificates. 3d. Instalments of the principal. 4th. A surplus to buy up
the alienated certificates, still avoiding to make any other provision for
these last. By the time the unalienated certificates should have been all paid,
he supposed half the alienated ones would have been bought up at market. He
would then have proceeded to redeem the residue of them.



 CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON. 

Bladensburg, October the lst, 1792. This morning, at Mount Vernon, I had the
following conversation with the President. He opened it by expressing his
regret at the resolution in which I appeared so fixed, in the letter I had
written him, of retiring from public affairs. He said, that he should be
extremely sorry that I should do it, as long as he was in office, and that he
could not see where he should find another character to fill my office. That,
as yet, he Was quite undecided whether to retire in March or not. His
inclinations led him strongly to do it. Nobody disliked more the ceremonies of
his office, and he had not the least taste or gratification in the execution of
its functions. That he was happy at home alone, and that his presence there was
now peculiarly called for by the situation of Major Washington, whom he thought
irrecoverable, and should



316 Jefferson's Works



he get well, he would remove into another part of the country, which might
better agree with him. That he did not believe his presence necessary; that
there were other characters who would do the business as well or better. Still,
however, if his aid was thought necessary to save the cause to which he had
devoted his life principally, he would make the sacrifice of a longer
continuance. That he therefore reserved himself for future decision, as his
declaration would be in time if made a month before, the day of election. He
had desired Mr. Lear to find out from conversation, without appearing to make
the inquiry, whether any other person would be desired by any body. He had
informed him, he judged from conversations that it was the universal desire he
should continue, and he believed that those who expressed a doubt of his
continuance, did it in the language of apprehension, and not of desire. But
this, said he, is only from the north; it may be very different in the south. I
thought this meant as an opening to me to say what was the sentiment in the
south, from which quarter I came. I told him, that as far as I knew, there was
but one voice there, which was for his continuance. That as to myself, I had
ever preferred the pursuits of private life to those of public, which had
nothing in them agreeable to me. I explained to him +he circumstances of the
war which had first called me into public life, and those following the war,
which had called me from a retirement on which I had determined. That I had con



The Anas 317



stantly kept my eye on my own home, and could no longer refrain from returning
to it. As to himself, his presence was important ; that he was the only man in
the United States who possessed the confidence of the whole; that government
was founded in opinion and confidence, and that the longer he remained, the
stronger would become the habits of the people in submitting to the Government,
and in thinking it a thing to be maintained ; that there was no other person
who would be thought anything more than the head of a party. He then expressed
his concern at the difference which he found to subsist between the Secretary
of the Treasury and myself, of which he said he had not been aware. He knew,
indeed, that there was a marked difference in our political sentiments, but he
had never suspected it had gone so far in producing a personal difference, and
he wished he could be the mediator to put an end to it. That he thought it
important to preserve the check of my opinions in the Administration, in order
to keep things in their proper channel, and prevent them from going too far.
That as to the idea of transforming this Government into a monarchy, he did not
believe there were ten men in the United States whose opinions were worth
attention, who entertained such a thought. I told him there were many more than
he imagined. I recalled to his memory a dispute at his own table, a little
before we. left Philadelphia, between General Schuyler on one side and Pinckney
and myself on the other, wherein



318 Jefferson's Works



the former maintained the position, that hereditary descent was as likely to
produce good magistrates as election.. I told him, that though the people were
sound, there were a numerous sect who had monarchy in contemplation; that the
Secretary of the Treasury was one of these. That I had heard him say that this
Constitution was a shilly shally thing, of mere milk and water, which could not
last, and was only good as a step to something better. That when we reflected,
that he had endeavored in the convention, to make an English constitution of
it, and when failing in that, we saw all his measures tending to bring it to
the same thing, it was natural for us to be jealous; and particularly, when we
saw that these measures had established corruption in the legislature, where
there was a squadron devoted to the nod of the Treasury, doing whatever he had
directed, and ready to do what he should direct. That if the equilibrium of the
three great bodies, legislative, executive and judiciary, could be preserved,
if the legislature could be kept independent, I should never fear the result oú
such a government; but that I could not but be uneasy, when I saw that the
executive had swallowed up the legislative branch. He said, that as to that
interested spirit in the legislature, it was what could not be avoided in any
government, unless we were to exclude particular descriptions of men, such as
the holders of the funds, from all office. I told him, there was great differ



The Anas 319



ence between the little accidental schemes of self interest, which would take
place in every body of men, and influence their votes, and a regular system for
forming a corps of interested persons, who should be steadily at the orders of
the Treasury. He touched on the merits of the funding system, observed there
was a difference of opinion about it, some thinking it very bad, others very
good ; that experience was the only criterion of right which he knew, and this
alone would decide which opinion was right. That for himself, he had seen our
affairs desperate and our credit lost, and that this was in a sudden and
extraordinary degree raised to the highest pitch. I told him, all that was ever
necessary to establish our credit, was an efficient government and an honest
one, declaring it would sacredly pay our debts, laying taxes for this purpose,
and applying them to it. I avoided going further into the subject. He finished
by another exhortation to me not to decide too positively on retirement, and
here we were called to breakfast.







October the 3lst, l792. I had sent to the President, Viar and Jaudenes's letter
of the 29th instant, whereupon he desired a consultation of Hamilton, Knox, E.
Randolph, and myself, on these points: 1. What notice was to be taken hereof to
Spain? 2. Whether it should make part of the communication to the legislature ?
I delivered my opinion, that it



320 Jefferson's Works



ought to be communicated to both Houses, because the communications intended to
be made, being to bring on the question, whether they would declare war against
any, and which of the nations or parts of the nations of Indians to the south,
it would be proper this information should be before them, that they might know
how far such a declaration would lead them. There might be some who would be
for war against the Indians, if it were to stop there, but who would not be for
it, if it were to lead to a war against Spain. I thought it should be laid
before both Houses, because it concerned the question of declaring war, which
was the function equally of both Houses. I thought a simple acknowledgment of
the receipt of the letter should be made by me to the Spanish Charges,
expressing that it contained some things very unexpected to us, but that we
should refer the whole, as they had proposed, to the negotiators at Madrid.
This would secure to us a continuation of the suspension of Indian hostilities,
which the Governor of New Orleans said he had brought about till the result of
the negotiation at Madrid should be known; would not commit us as to running or
not running the line, or imply any admission of doubt about our territorial
right ; and would avoid a rupture with Spain, which was much to be desired,
while we had similar points to discuss with Great Britain. Hamilton declared
himself the advocate for peace. War would derange our affairs greatly; throw us



The Anas 321



back many years in the march toward prosperity ; be difficult for us to pursue,
our countrymen not being disposed to become soldiers ; a part of the Union
feeling no interest in the war, would with difficulty be brought to exert
itself ; and we had no navy. He was for everything which would procrastinate
the event. A year, even, was a great gain to a nation strengthening as we were.
It laid open to us, too, the chapter of accidents, which, in the present state
of Europe, was a very pregnant one- That while, however, he was for delaying
the event of war, he had no doubt it was to take place between us for the
object in question; that jealousy and perseverance were remarkable features in
the character of the Spanish government, with respect to their American
possessions; that so far from receding as to their claims against us, they had
been strengthening themselves in them. He had no doubt the present
communication was by authority from the court. Under this impression, he
thought we should be looking forward to the day of rupture, and preparing for
it. That if we were unequal to the contest ourselves, it behooved us to provide
allies for our aid. That in. this view, but two nations could be named, France
and England. France was too intimately connected with Spain in other points,
and of too great mutual value, ever to separate for us. Her affairs too, were
such, that whatever issue they had, she could not be in a situation to



VOL.. 1-21



Jefferson's Works



make a respectable mediation for us. England alone, then, remained. It would
not be easy to affect it with her; however, he was for trying it, and for
sounding them on the proposition of a defensive treaty of alliance. The
inducements to such a treaty, on their part, might be, 1. The desire of
breaking up our former connections, which. we knew they had long wished. 2. A
continuance of the statu quo in commerce for ten years, which he believed would
be desirable to them. 3. An admission to some navigable part of the
Mississippi, by some line drawn from the Lake of the Woods to such navigable
part. He had not, he said, examined the map to see how such a line might be
run, so as not to make too great a sacrifice. The navigation of the Mississippi
being a joint possession, we might then take measures in concert for the joint.
security of it. He was, therefore, for immediately sounding them on this
subject through our ministers at London; yet so as to keep ourselves unengaged
as long as possible, in hopes a favorable issue with Spain might be otherwise
effected. But he was for sounding immediately, and for not letting slip an
opportunity of securing our object. E. Randolph concurred, in general, with me.
He objected that such an alliance could not be effected without pecuniary
consideration probably, which we could not give. And what was to be their aid ?
If men, our citizens would see their armies get foothold in the United States,
with great jealousy; it



The Anas 323



would be difficult to protect them. Even the French, during the distress of the
late war, excited some jealous sentiments. Hamilton said, money was often, but
not always demanded, and the aid he should propose to stipulate would be in
ships. Knox non dissentiente. The President said the remedy would be worse than
the disease, and stated some of the disagreeable circumstances which would
attend our making such overtures.







November, l792. Hamilton called on me to speak about our furnishing supplies to
the French colony of St. Domingo. He expressed his opinion, that we ought to be
cautious, and not go too far in our application of money to their use, lest it
should not be recognized by the mother country. He did not even think that some
kinds of government they might establish could give a sufficient sanction.(1) I
observed, that the National Convention







        _______________



(1) There had been a previous consultation at the President's (about the first
week in November) on the expediency of suspending payments to France, under her
present situation. I had admitted that the late constitution was dissolved by
the dethronement of the King; and the management of affairs surviving to the
National Assembly only, this was not an integral Legislature, and therefore not
competent to give a legitimate discharge for our payments: that I thought,
consequently, that none should be made till some legitimate body came into
place; and that I should consider the National Convention called, but not met
as we had yet heard, to be a legitimate body. Hamilton doubted whether it would
be a legitimate body, and whether, if the King should be re-established, he
might not disallow such payments on



324 Jefferson's Works



was now met, and would certainly establish a form of government ; that as we
had recognized the former government because established by authority of the
nation, so we must recognize any other which should be established by the
authority of the nation. He said we had recognized the former, because it
contained an important member of the ancient, to wit : the King, and wore the
appearance of his consent; but if, in any future form, they should omit the
King, he did not know that we could with safety recognize it, or pay money to
its order.



 November the l9th, l792. Beckley brings me the pamphlet written by Hamilton,
before the war, in answer to Common Sense. It is entitled " Plain Truth."
Melancthon Smith sends it to Beckley and in his letter says, it was not printed
in New York by Loudon, because prevented by a mob,. and was printed in
Philadelphia, and that he has these facts from Loudon.



 November the 21st, 1792. Mr. Butler tells me, that he dined last winter with
Mr. Campbell from Denmark, in company with Hamilton, Lawrence,







        _______________



good grounds. Knox, for once, dared to differ from Hamilton, and to express,
very submissively, an opinion, that a convention named by the whole body of the
nation, would be competent to do anything. It ended by agreeing, that I should
write to Gouverneur Morris to suspend payment generally, till further orders.



The Anas 325



Dr. Shippen, T. Shippen, and one other person whom he cannot recollect. That
after dinner political principles became the subject of conversation; that
Hamilton declared openly, that "there was .no stability, no security in any
kind of government but a monarchy. " That Lawrence took him up, and entered the
lists of argument against him; that the. dispute continued long, and grew warm,
remarkably so as between them ; that T. Shippen; at length, joined Lawrence in
it; and in fine, that it broke up the company. Butler recommended to the
company, that the dispute having probably gone farther than was intended, it
ought to be considered as confined to the company.



 December the 10th, 1792. Present : Alexander Hamilton, General Knox, Edmund
Randolph, and Th: Jefferson, at the President's. It was agreed to reject
meeting the Indians at the proposed treaty; rather than to admit a mediation by
Great Britain ; but to admit the presence of Governor Simcoe, not as a party
(if that was insisted on) ; and that I should make a verbal communication to
Mr. Hammond, in substance, as on the back hereof, which I previously read to
the President.



 December the 12th. I made the communication to Mr. Hammond. He said the
attendance of Governor Simcoe was a circumstance only men-



326 Jefferson's Works



tioned by him, but not desired; that he would decline it without difficulty;
declared it to be their most ardent wish that peace should take place, for
their fur-trade was entirely interrupted; and he urged as decisive proof of the
sincerity of their wish. lst. That they had kept the late Indian council
together six weeks at a very great expense, waiting for the Six Nations. ad.
That the Indians at that council were so perfectly satisfied of their desire
that they should make peace, that they had not so much as mentioned in council
the applying to the British for any supplies. I immediately communicated this
to the President.



 December the l3th, 1792. The President called on me to see the model and
drawings of some mills of sawing stone. After showing them, he in the course of
a subsequent conversation asked me if there were not some good manufactories of
porcelain in Germany; that he was in want of table china, and had been speaking
to Mr. Shaw, who was going to the East Indies to bring him a set, but he found
that it would not come till he should no longer be in a situation to want it.
He took occasion a second time to observe that Shaw said it would be two years
at least, before he could have the china here, before which time he said he
should be where he should not need it. I think he asked the question about the
manufactories in Germany merely to



The Anas 327



have an indirect opportunity of telling me he meant to retire, and within the
limits of two years.



 December the l7th. Hammond says the person is here to whom the Six Nations
delivered the invitation for Simcoe to attend, who says they insisted on it,
and would consider his non-attendance as an evidence that he does not wish for
peace; but he says that Simcoe has not the least idea of attending; that this
gentleman says we may procure in Upper Canada any quantity of provisions, which
the people will salt up expressly during winter; and that he will return and
carry our request whenever we are ready. ,



CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON.



Thursday, December the 27th, 1792. I waited on the President on some current
business. After this was over, he observed to me, that he thought it was time
to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with France, and that Gouverneur
Morris should be written to on this subject. He went into the circumstances of
dissatisfaction between Spain and Great Britain, and us, and observed, there
was no nation on whom we could rely,. at all times, but France ; and that, if
we did not prepare in time some support, in the event of rupture with Spain and
England, we might be charged with a criminal negligence. [I was much pleased
with the tone of these observations. It was the very



328 Jefferson's Works



doctrine which had been my polar star, and I did not need the successes of the
republican arms in France, lately announced to us, to bring me to these
sentiments. For it is to be noted, that on Saturday last (the 22d) I received
Mr. Short's letters of October the 9th and 12th, with the Leyden gazettes to
October the l3th, giving us the first news of the retreat of the Duke of
Brunswick, and the capture of Spires and Worms by Custine, and that of Nice by
Anselme.] I therefore expressed to the President my cordial approbation of
these ideas; told him I had meant on that day (as an opportunity of writing by
the British packet would occur immediately) to take his orders for removing the
suspension of payments to France, which had been imposed by my last letter to
Gouverneur Morris, but was meant, as I supposed, only for the interval between
the abolition of the late constitution by the dethronement of the King, and the
meeting of some other body, invested by the will of the nation with powers to
transact their affairs ; that I considered the National Convention, then
assembled, as. such a body; and that, therefore, we ought to go on with the
payments to them, or to any government they should establish that, however, I
had learned last night.; that some clause in the bill for providing
reimbursement of the loan made by the bank to the United States, had given rise
to a question before the House of Representatives yesterday, which might affect
these pay



The Anas 329



ments ; a clause in that bill proposing, that the money formerly borrowed in
Amsterdam, to pay the French debt, and appropriated by law, (1690, August 4th,
c. 34, s. 2) to that purpose, lying dead as was suggested, should be taken to
pay the bank, and the President be authorized to borrow ' two millions of
dollars more, out of which it should be replaced; and if this should be done,
the removal of our suspension of payments, as I had been about to propose,
would be premature. He expressed his disapprobation of the clause above
mentioned; thought it highly improper in the Legislature to change an
appropriation once made, and added, that no one could tell in what that would
end. I concurred, but observed, that on a division of the House, the ayes for
striking out the clause were twenty-seven, the noes twenty-six; whereon the
Speaker gave his vote against striking out, which divides the House : the
clause for the disappropriation remained of course. I mentioned suspicions,
that the whole of this was a trick to serve the bank under a great existing
embarrassment; that the debt to the bank was to be repaid by instalments ; that
the first instalment was of two hundred thousand dollars only, or rather one
hundred and sixty thousand dollars, (because forty thousand of the two hundred
thousand dollars would be the United States' own dividend of the instalment).
Yet here were two millions to be paid them at once, and to be taken from a
purpose



330 Jefferson's Works



of gratitude and honor, to which it had been appropriated.



 December the 30th, 1792. I took the occasion furnished by Pinckney's letter of
September the 19th, asking instructions how to conduct himself as to the French
revolution, to lay down the catholic principle of republicanism, to wit, that
every people may establish What form of government they please, and change it
as they please; the will of the nation being the only thing essential. I Was
induced to do this, in order to extract the President's opinion on the question
which divided Hamilton and myself in the conversation of November, l792, and
the previous one of the first week of November, on the suspension of payments
to France; and if favorable to mine, to place the principles of record in the
letter books of my office. I therefore wrote the letter of December the 30th,
to Pinckney, and sent it to the President, and he returned me his approbation
in writing, in his NOTE of the same date, which see.



CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT WASHINGTON. February the 7th, 1793. I waited on the
President with letters and papers from Lisbon. After going through these, I
told him that I had for some time suspended speaking with him on the subject of
my going out of office, because I had understood that the bill for intercourse
with foreign nations



The Anas 331



was likely to be rejected by the Senate, in which case, the remaining business
of the Department would be too inconsiderable to make it worth while to keep it
up. But that the bill being now passed, I was freed from the considerations of
propriety which had embarrassed me. That &c. [nearly in the words of a letter
to Mr. T. M. Randolph, of a few days ago,) and that I should be willing, if he
had taken no arrangements to the contrary, to continue somewhat longer, how
long I could not say, perhaps till summer, perhaps autumn. He said, so far from
taking arrangements on the subject, he had never mentioned to any mortal the
design of retiring which I had expressed to him, till yesterday, when having
heard that I had given up my house, and that it was rented by another, he
thereupon mentioned it to Mr. E. Randolph, and asked him, as he knew my
retirement had been talked of, whether he had heard any persons suggested in
conversation to succeed me. He expressed his satisfaction at my change of
purpose, and his apprehensions that my retirement would be a new source of
uneasiness to the public. He said Governor Lee had that day informed him of the
general discontent prevailing in Virginia, of which he never had had any
conception, much less sound information. That it appeared to him very alarming.
He proceeded to express his earnest wish that Hamilton and myself could
coalesce in the measures of the government, and urged here the general reasons
for it



332 Jefferson's Works



which he had done to me in two former conversations. He said he had proposed
the same thing to Hamilton, who expressed his readiness, and he thought our
coalition would secure the general acquiescence of the public. I told him my
concurrence was of much less importance than he seemed to imagine; that I kept
myself aloof from all cabal and correspondence on the subject of the
Government, and saw and spoke with as few as I could. That as to a coalition
with Mr. Hamilton, if by that was meant that either was to sacrifice his
general system to the other, it was impossible. We had both, no doubt, formed
our conclusions after the most mature consideration; and principles
conscientiously adopted, could not be given up on either side. My wish was, to
see both Houses of Congress cleansed of all persons interested in the bank or
public stocks; and that a pure legislature being given us, I should always be
ready to acquiesce under their determinations, even if contrary to my own
opinions; for that I subscribe to the principle, that the will of the majority,
honestly expressed, should give law. I confirmed him in the fact of the great
discontents to the south that they were grounded on seeing that their judgments
and interests were sacrificed to those of the eastern States on every occasion,
and their belief that it was the effect of a corrupt squadron of voters in
Congress, at the command of the Treasury; and they see that if the votes of
those members who



The Anas 333



had any interest distinct from, and contrary to the general interest of their
constituents, had been withdrawn, as in decency and honesty they should have
been, the laws would have been the reverse of what they are on all the great
questions. I instanced the new Assumption carried in the House of
Representatives by the Speaker's vote. On this subject he made no reply. He
explained his remaining in office to have been the effect of strong
solicitations after he returned here; declaring that he had never mentioned his
purpose of going out but to the Heads of Departments and Mr. Madison ; he
expressed the extreme wretchedness of his existence while in office, and went
lengthily into the late attacks on him for levees, &c., and explained to me how
he had been led into them by the persons he consulted at New York; and that if
he could but know what the sense of the public was, he would most cheerfully
conform to it.



February the l6th, 1793. E. Randolph tells J. Madison. and myself, a curious
fact which he had from Lear. When the President went to New York, he resisted
for three weeks the efforts to introduce levees. At length he yielded, and left
it to Humphreys and some others to settle the forms. Accordingly, an
ante-chamber and presence room. were provided, and when those who were to pay
their court were assembled, the President set out,



334 Jefferson's Works



preceded by Humphreys. After passing through the ante-chamber, the door of the
inner room was thrown open, and Humphreys entered first, calling out with a
loud voice, " the President of the United States." The President was so much
disconcerted with it, that he did not recover from it the whole time of the
levee, and when the company was gone, he said to Humphreys, " Well, .you have
taken me in once, but by God you shall never take me in a second time."



There is reason to believe that the rejection of the late additional Assumption
by the Senate, was effected by the President through Lear, operating on
Langdon. Beckley knows this.



 February the 20th, 1793. Colonel W. S. Smith called on me to communicate
intelligence from France. He had left Paris November the Th. He said the French
ministers are entirely broken with Gouverneur Morris ; shut their doors to him,
and will never receive another communication from him. They wished Smith to be
the bearer of a message from the President, to this effect, but he declined;
and they said in that case they would press it through their own Minister here.
He said they are sending Genet here with full powers to give us all the
privileges we can desire in their countnes, and particularly in the West Indies
; that they even contemplate to set them free the next summer;



The Anas 335



that they propose to emancipate South America, and will send forty-five ships
oú the line there next spring, and Miranda at the head of the expedition ; that
they desire our debt to be paid them in provisions, and have authorized him to
negotiate this. In confirmation of this, he delivers a letter to the President
from Le Brun, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Le Brun says that Colonel
Smith will communicate plans worthy of his (the President's) great mind, and he
shall be happy to receive his opinion as to the means the most suitable to
effect it. I had, five or six days ago, received from Ternant, extracts. from
the lives of his Ministers, complaining oú both Gouverneur Morris and Mr.
Short. I sent them this day to the President with an extract from a private
letter of Mr. Short, justifying himself, and I called this evening on the
President. He said he considered the extracts from Ternant very serious-in
short, as decisive ; that he saw that Gouverneur Morris could be no longer
continued there consistent with the public good; that the moment was critical
in our favor, and ought not to be lost; that he was extremely at a loss what
arrangement to make. I asked him whether Gouverneur Morris and Pinckney might
not change places. He said that would be a sort of remedy, but not a radical
one. That if the French Ministry conceived Gouverneur Morris to be hostile to
them; if they would be jealous merely on his proposing to visit London, they
would never be satisfied with us at



336 Jefferson's Works



placing him at London permanently. He then observed, that though I had unfixed
the day on which I had intended to resign, yet I appeared fixed in doing it at
no great distance of time; that in this case, he could not but wish that I
would go to Paris; that the moment was important : I possessed the confidence
of both sides, and might do great good; that he wished I could do it, were it
only to stay there a year or two. I told him that my mind was so bent on
retirement that I could not think of launching forth again in a new business;
that I could never again cross the Atlantic; and that as to the opportunity of
doing good, this was likely to be the scene of action, as Genet was bringing
powers to do the business here ; but that I could not think of going abroad. He
replied that I had pressed him to continue in the public service, and refused
to do the same myself. I said the case was very different; he united the
confidence of all America, and was the only person who did so : his services
therefore were of the last importance; but for myself, my going out would not
be noted or known. A thousand others could supply my place to equal advantage,
therefore I felt myself free; and that as to the mission to France, I thought
perfectly proper. He desired me then to consider maturely what arrangement
should be made. Smith, in speaking of Morris, said, that at his own table, in
presence of his company and servants, he cursed the French Ministers, as a set
of damned



The Anas 337



rascals ; said the King would still be replaced upon his throne. He said he
knew they had written to have him recalled, and expected to be recalled. He
consulted Smith to know whether he would bring his furniture here duty free.
Smith has mentioned the situation of Gouverneur Morris freely to others here.
Smith said also that the Ministers told him they meant to begin their attack at
the mouth of the Mississippi, and to sweep along the Bay of Mexico southwardly,
and that they would have no objection to our incorporating into our Government
the two Floridas.



February the 25th, 1793. The President desires the opinions of the Heads oú the
three Departments, and of the Attorney General, on the following question, to
wit : Mr. Ternant having applied for money equivalent to three millions of
livres, to be furnished on account of our debt to France at the request of the
Executive of that country, which sum is to be laid out in provisions within the
United States, to be sent to France. Shall the money be furnished? The
Secretary of the Treasury stated it as his opinion, that making a liberal
allowance for the depreciation of  assignats, (no rule of liquidation having
been yet fixed,) a sum of about three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars may
not exceed the arrearages equitably due to France to the end of 1792, and that
the whole sum asked for may be furnished within periods capable oú answering
the



VOL.. 1-22



338 Jefferson's Works



purpose of Mr. Ternant's application, without a derangement of the Treasury.
Whereupon the Secretaries of State and War, and the Attorney General, are of
opinion that the whole sum asked for by Mr. Ternant ought to be furnished the
Secretary of the Treasury is of opinion that the supply ought not exceed the
above-mentioned sum of three hundred and eighteen thousand dollars. The
President having required the attendance of the Heads of the three Departments,
and of the Attorney General, at his house, on Monday the 25th of February,
1793, the following questions were proposed, and answers given : 1. The
Governor of Canada having refused to let us obtain provisions from that
province, or to pass them along the water communication to the place of treaty
with the Indians ; and the Indians having refused to let them pass peaceably
along what they call the bloody path, the Governor of Canada at the same time
proposing to furnish the whole provisions necessary, ought the treaty to
proceed? Answer unanimously, it ought to proceed. 2. Have the Executive, or the
Executive and Senate together, authority to relinquish to the Indians the right
of soil of any part of the land north of the Ohio, which has been validly
obtained by former treaties ? The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
War, and Attorney General, are of opinion that the Executive and Senate have
such authority, provided



The Anas 339



that no grants to individuals, nor reservations to States, be thereby
infringed. The Secretary of State is of opinion they have no such authority to
relinquish.



3. Will it be expedient to make any such relinquishments to the Indians, if
essential to peace? The Secretaries of the Treasury and War, and the Attorney
General, are of opinion it will be expedient to make such relinquishments if
essential to peace, provided it do not include any lands sold or received for
special purposes (the reservations for trading places excepted): The Secretary
of State is of opinion that the Executive and Senate have authority to
stipulate with the Indians, and that if essential to peace, it will be
expedient to stipulate that we will not settle any lands between those already
sold, or reserved for special purposes, and the lines heretofore validly
established with the Indians.



Whether the Senate shall be previously consulted on this point. The opinion
unanimously is, that it will be better not to consult them previously.



 February the 26th, 1793. Notes on the proceedings oú yesterday. [See the
formal opinions given to the President in writing, and signed.]



First question. We are all of opinion that the treaty should proceed merely to
gratify the public opinion, and not from an expectation of success. I expressed
myself strongly, that the event was so



340 Jefferson's Works



unpromising, that I thought the preparations for a campaign should go on
without the least relaxation, and that a day should be fixed with the
commissioners for the treaty, beyond which they should not permit the treaty to
be protracted, by which day orders should be given for our forces to enter into
action. The President took up the thing instantly, after I had said this, and
declared that he was so much of the opinion that the treaty would end in
nothing, that he then, in the presence of us all, gave orders to General Knox,
not to slacken the preparations for the campaign in the least, but to exert
every nerve in preparing for it. Knox said something about the ultimate day for
continuing the negotiations. I acknowledged myself not a judge on what day the
campaign should begin, but that whatever it was, that day should terminate the
treaty. Knox said he thought a winter campaign was always the most efficacious
against the Indians. I was of opinion, since Great Britain insisted on
furnishing provisions, that we should offer to repay. Hamilton thought we
should not. Second question. I considered our right of preemption of the Indian
lands, not as amounting to any dominion, or jurisdiction, or paramountship
whatever, but merely in the nature of a remainder after the extinguishment of a
present right, which gave us no present right whatever, but of preventing other
nations from taking possession, and so defeating our expectancy; that the
Indians had the full



The Anas 341



undivided and independent sovereignty as long as they choose to keep it, and
that this might be forever; that as fast as we extend our rights by purchase
from them, so fast we extend the limits of our society, and as soon as a new
portion became encircled within our line, it became a fixed limit of our
society ; that the Executive, with either or both branches of the legislature,
could not alien any part of our territory ; that by the law of nations it was
settled, that the unity and indivisibility of the society was so fundamental,
that it could not be dismembered by the constituted authorities, except, 1,
where all power was delegated to them (as in the case of despotic governments),
or, 2, where it was expressly delegated; that neither of these delegations had
been made to our general Government, and therefore, that it had no right to
dismember or alienate any portion of territory once ultimately consolidated
with us; and that we could no more cede to the Indians than to the English or
Spaniards, as it might, according to acknowledged principles, remain as
irrevocably and eternally with the one as the other. But I thought, that as we
had a right to sell and settle lands once comprehended within our lines, so we
might forbear to exercise that right, retaining the property till circumstances
should be more favorable to the settlement, and this I agreed to do in the
present instance, if necessary for peace. Hamilton agreed to the doctrine of
the law of nations, as laid down in Europe, but that it was



342 Jefferson's Works



founded on the universality of settlement there; consequently, that no lopping
off of territory could be made without a lopping off of citizens, which
required their consent; but that the law of nations for us must be adapted to
the circumstance of our unsettled country, which he conceived the President and
Senate may cede ; that the power of treaty was given to them by the
Constitution, without restraining it to particular objects; consequently, that
it was given in as plenipotentiary a form as held by any sovereign in any other
society. Randolph was of opinion there was a difference between a cession to
Indians and to any others, because it only restored the ceded part to the
condition in which it was before we bought it, and consequently, that we might
buy rt again hereafter; therefore, he thought the Executive and Senate could
cede it. Knox joined in the main opinion. The President discovered no opinion,
but he made some efforts to get us to join in some terms which could unite us
all, and he seemed to direct those efforts more towards me; but the thing could
not be done. Third question. We agreed in idea as to the line to be drawn, to
wit, so as to retain all lands appropriated, or granted, or reserved. Fourth
question. We all thought if the Senate should be consulted, and consequently
apprized of our line, it would become known to Hammond, and we should lose all
chance of saving anything more at the treaty than our ultimatum.



The Anas 343



The President, at this meeting, mentioned the declaration of some person, in a
paper of Fenno, that he would commence an attack on the character of Dr.
Franklin. He said the theme was to him excessively disagreeable on other
considerations, but most particularly so, as the party seemed to do it as a
means of defending him (the President) against the late attacks on him; that
such a mode of defence would be peculiarly painful to him, and he wished it
could be stopped. Hamilton and Randolph undertook to speak to Fenno to suppress
it, without mentioning it as the President's wish. Both observed that they had
heard this declaration mentioned in many companies, and that it had excited
universal horror and detestation. The paper in Fenno must lie between two
persons, viz., Adams and Izard, because they are the only persons who could
know such facts as are there promised to be unfolded. Adams is an enemy to both
characters, and might choose this ground as an effectual position to injure
both. Izard hated Franklin with unparalleled bitterness, but humbly adores the
President, because he is in loco regis. If the paper proceeds, we shall easily
discover which of these two gentlemen is the champion. In the meantime, the
first paper leads our suspicions more towards Izard than Adams, from the
circumstance of style, and because he is quite booby enough not to see the
injury he would do to the President by such a mode of defence.



344 Jefferson's Works



February the 28th. Knox, E. Randolph and myself met at Knox's, where Hamilton
was also to have met, to consider the time, manner and place of the President's
swearing in. Hamilton had been there before, and had left his opinion with Knox
to wit, that the President should ask a judge to attend him in his own house to
administer the oath, in the presence of the Heads of Departments, which oath
should be deposited in the Secretary of State's office. I concurred in this
opinion. Randolph was for the President's going to the Senate's chamber to take
the oath, attended by the Marshal of the United States, who should then make
proclamation, &c. Knox was for this, and for adding the House of
Representatives to the presence, as they would not yet be departed. Our
individual opinions were written, to be communicated to the President, out of
which he might form one. In the course of our 'conversation, Knox, sickling for
parade, got into great warmth, and swore that our Government must either be
entirely new modeled, or it would be knocked to pieces in less than ten years;
and that as it is at present, he would not give a copper for it; that it is the
President's character, and not the written constitution, which keeps it
together. Same day. Conversation with Lear. He ex- pressed the strongest
confidence that republicanism was the universal creed of America, except of a
very few; that a republican administration must oú necessity immediately
overbear the contrary faction;



The Anas 345



said that he had seen with extreme regret that a number of gentlemen had for a
long time been endeavoring to instil into the President, that the noise against
the administration of the Government was that of a little faction, which would
soon be silent, and which was detested by the people, who were contented and
prosperous ; that this very party, however, began to see their error, and that
the sense of America was bursting forth to their conviction.



March the 2d, 1793. See in the papers of this date, Mr. Giles's resolutions. He
and one or two others were sanguine enough to believe that the palpableness of
these resolutions rendered it impossible the House could reject them. Those who
knew the composition of the House, 1, of bank directors ; 2, holders of bank
stock; 3, stock jobbers; 4, blind devotees; 5, ignorant persons who did not
comprehend them; 6, lazy and good-humored persons, who comprehended and
acknowledged them, yet were too lazy to examine, or unwilling to pronounce
censure; the persons who knew these characters, foresaw that the three first
descriptions making one-third of the House, the three latter would make
one-half of the residue; and, of course, that they would be rejected by a
majority of two to one. But they thought that even this rejection would do
good, by showing the public the desperate and abandoned dispositions with which
their affairs were conducted. The reso-



346 Jefferson's Works



lutions were proposed, and nothing spared to present them in the fulness of
demonstration. There were not more than three or four who voted otherwise than
had been expected.



 March the 30th, 1793. At our meeting at the President's, February the 25th, in
discussing the question, whether we should furnish to France the three millions
of livres desired, Hamilton, in speaking on the subject, used this expression,
" When Mr. Genet arrives, whether we shall receive him or not will then be a
question for discussion," which expression I did not recollect till E. Randolph
reminded me of it a few days after. Therefore, on the 20th instant, as the
President was shortly to set out for Mount Vernon, I observed to him, that as
Genet might arrive in his absence, I wished to know beforehand how I should
treat him, whether as a person who would or would not be received ? He said he
could see no ground of doubt but that he ought to be received. On the 24th he
asked E. Randolph's opinion on the subject, saying he had consulted Colonel
Hamilton thereon, who went into lengthy considerations of doubt and difficulty,
and viewing it as a very unfortunate thing that the President should have the
decision of so critical a point forced on him; but, in conclusion, said, since
he was brought into that situation, he did not see but that he must receive Mr.
Genet. Randolph told the President



The Anas 347



he was clear he should be received, and the President said he had never had any
doubt on the subject in his mind. Afterwards, on the same day, he spoke to me
again on it, and said Mr. Genet should unquestionably be received; but he
thought not with too much warmth or cordiality, so only as to be satisfactory
to him. I wondered at first at this restriction; but when Randolph afterwards
communicated to me his conversation of the 24th, I became satisfied it was a
small sacrifice to the opinion of Hamilton.



 March the 3lst. Mr. Beckley tells me, that the merchants' bonds for duties on
six months' credit became due the 1st instant to a very great amount, that
Hamilton went to the bank on that day, and directed the bank to discount for
those merchants all their bonds at thirty days, and that he would have the
collectors credited for the money at the Treasury. Hence, the Treasury lumping
its receipts by the month in its printed accounts, these sums will be
considered by the public as only received on the last day ; consequently, the
bank makes the month's interest out of it. Beckley had this from a merchant who
had a bond discounted, and supposes a million of dollars were discounted at the
bank here. Mr. Brown got the same information from another merchant, who
supposed only six hundred thousand dollars discounted here. But they suppose
the same orders went to all the branch banks to a great amount.

348 Jefferson's Works



Eodem die. Mr. Brown tells me he has it from a merchant, that during the last
winter the directors of the bank ordered the freest discounts. Every man could
obtain it. Money being so flush, the six per cents run up to twenty-one and
twenty-two shillings. Then the directors sold out their private stocks. When
the discounted notes were becoming due, they stopped discounts, and not a
dollar was to be had. This reduced six per cents to eighteen shillings and
three pence; then the same directors bought in again.



 April the 7th, 1793. Mr. Lear called on me, and introduced of himself a
conversation on the affairs of the United States. He laughed at the cry of
prosperity, and the deriving it from the establishment of the Treasury: he
said, that so far from giving into this opinion, and that we were paying off
our national debt, he was clear the debt was growing on us ; that he had lately
expressed this opinion to the President, who appeared much astonished at it. I
told him I had given the same hint to the President last summer, ' and lately
again had suggested, that we were even depending for the daily subsistence of
Government on borrowed money. He said, that was certain, and was the only way
of accounting for what was become of the money drawn over from Holland to this
country. He regretted that the President was not in the way of hearing full
information,



The Anas 349



declared he communicated to him everything he could learn himself; that the men
who vaunted the present Government so much on some occasions, were the very men
who at other times declared it was a poor thing, and such a one as could not
stand, and he was sensible they only esteemed it as a stepping stone to
something else, and had availed themselves of the first moments of the
enthusiasm in favor oú it, to pervert its principles and make of it what they
wanted ; and that though they raised the cry of anti-federalism against those
who censured the mode of administration, yet he was satisfied, whenever it
should come to be tried, that the very men whom they called anti-federalists,
were the men who would save the Government, and he looked to the next Congress
for much rectification.



 April the l8th. The President sends a set of questions to be considered, and
calls a meeting. Though those sent me were in his own hand writing, yet it was
palpable from the style, their ingenious tissue and suite, that they were not
the President's that they were raised upon a prepared chain of argument, in
short, that the language was Hamilton's, and the doubts his alone. They led to
a declaration of the Executive, that our treaty with France is void. E.
Randolph, the next day, told me that the day before the date of these
questions, Hamilton went with him through the whole chain of



350 Jefferson's Works



reasoning of which these questions are the skeleton, and that he recognized
them the moment he saw them. We met. The first question, whether we should
receive the French minister, Genet, was proposed, and we agreed unanimously
that he should be received ; Hamilton, at the same time, expressing his great
regret that any incident had happened, which should oblige us to recognize the
government. The next question was, whether he should be received absolutely, or
with qualifications. Here Hamilton took up the whole subject, and went through
it in the order in which the questions sketch it. See the chain of his
reasoning in my opinions of April the 28th. Knox subscribed at once to
Hamilton's opinion that we ought to declare the treaty void, acknowledging, at
the same time, like a fool as he is, that he knew nothing about it. I was clear
it remained valid. Randolph declared himself of the same opinion, but on
Hamilton's undertaking to present to him the authority in' Vattel (which we had
not present) and to prove to him, that if the authority was admitted, the
treaty might be declared void, Randolph agreed to take further time to
consider. It was adjourned. We determined, unanimously; the last question, that
Congress should not be called. There having been an intimation by Randolph,
that in so great a question he should choose to give a written ' opinion, and
this being appro